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Abstract
The rising interest in network theory among supply chain scholars reflects an emerging shift in
perspective. To deliver global speed, efficiency, and responsiveness, modern firms’ supply chains
are becoming increasingly complex. The patterns of interactions and interdependencies among
hundreds of firms interconnected by these complex supply chains cannot be adequately explored
from the dyadic perspective, which has dominated supply chain research for decades. Many supply
chain scholars agree that the language of networks can provide a syntax and structure to describe
and explore this complex reality. The actual application of network theory in supply chain research,
however, has been limited. This dissertation provides three examples of how rigorous network
analysis can furnish both a theory and a method to study modern firms’ supply chains and obtain
new knowledge advancing both scholarly thought and business practice. In this light, this
dissertation may serve as a guide for supply chain scholars seeking to leverage the potential of
empirical network analysis in their research.
Essay 1 explores some of the ways in which structural properties of a firm’s supply network
affect the accuracy of forecasts made by stock analysts. Essay 2 examines how a firm’s supply
network changes its structure when the firm experiences stretches of financial difficulty. Essay 3
investigates how the structure of a firm’s supply network changes as the firm unfolds a significant
exploratory innovation project. Collectively, these three essays demonstrate the value of the
network perspective as a great connector of ideas extending the interface between supply chain
management and other business disciplines.
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INTRODUCTION
The network view is fast becoming a core perspective in supply chain management research.
Network theory provides a way to explore why and how firms interact, where and when interfirm
links form, and how the resulting networks affect firms’ performance. Network analysis provides
the math behind some of the most interesting but least explored phenomena in firms’ activity and
evolution. This dissertation provides several illustrations of how network theory and network
analysis can be employed to yield additional insights about firms’ innovation, stock returns, and
reactions to changes in the conditions of their partners. Overall, the three essays show that network
theory can be fruitfully applied to advance supply chain management research. Most extant studies
using network theory to study supply chain phenomena rely on limited datasets. In this dissertation,
I use a novel extensive longitudinal dataset to probe deeply into firms’ supply networks and their
evolution over time. This dissertation shows that different configurations of networks produce
different advantages. Thus, developing a nuanced understanding of their networks will help firms
to obtain an advantage over competitors.
Equity analysts, for instance, increasingly include supply network information into their
forecasts of firms’ performance. Essay 1 draws on the network and behavioral forecasting
literature to identify structural properties which make supply networks more cognitively accessible
for equity analysts and lead to more accurate forecasts. With a dataset used by practicing equity
analysts, I map and quantify the structure of multi-tier supply networks of 25 U.S. manufacturing
firms over 10 years, each network consisting of the average of 3,032 supplier firms. Analyzing
these networks, I find a significant association between supply network structure and the accuracy
of equity analysts’ forecasts. In particular, my results show that analysts are able to produce more
accurate forecasts if the firm’s supply network has prominent hubs or clusters. In contrast, analysts
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produce less accurate forecasts for firms with supply networks having small-world structures. This
essay identifies a previously unknown determinant of equity analysts’ forecast accuracy and
emphasizes the importance of supply networks for outside stakeholders including equity analysts
and investors.
The other two essays focus on the evolution of supply networks over time. While we know
a good deal about factors influencing stability in interfirm networks, we know little about forces
driving network change. In Essay 2, I examine the effects of a crucial variable – uncertainty
specific to a key exchange partner – on patterns of novel tie formation and old tie deletion which
together shape trajectories of network evolution. Using longitudinal data on buyer-supplier
relations, I map and analyze supply networks of 30 large U.S. manufacturing firms. These dynamic
webs of organizations consist of an average of 3,020 suppliers. My findings show that when
environmental munificence is greater, the stretches of unique uncertainty experienced by firms are
followed by an increase in both the number of novel ties formed and the number of old ties deleted
by their immediate suppliers. Surprisingly, these immediate suppliers curtail their rates of novel
tie formation and old tie deletion in response to changes in the focal firms’ unique uncertainty
when environmental munificence is lower. In this light, Essay 2 provides evidence that the
influence of structural constraints on organizational action varies between stable and unstable
periods.
Essay 3, in turn, examines a previously unexplored link between a firm’s innovative agency
and the structure of its supply network. Extant studies have shown that supply network structure
powerfully enables and constrains the focal firm’s innovative actions. In Essay 3, I theorize and
empirically test the idea that deliberative, purposeful efforts of an individual firm – its agency –
and the structure of its supply network reciprocally constitute each other. In this essay, I analyze
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the dynamics of supply networks of 45 global firms, each consisting of thousands of suppliers, and
find that the firms’ innovative agency changes several structural properties of these networks.
Specifically, I find that as these firms unfold exploratory innovation, they and their direct and
indirect suppliers start forming new network ties, thus influencing the size, average path length,
density, and the small-world architecture of their vast supply networks.

3

ESSAY 1. THE EFFECT OF SUPPLY NETWORK STRUCTURE ON EQUITY
ANALYSTS’ FORECASTS
Introduction
To create customer value and sustain competitive advantage, firms depend on their increasingly
global supply networks connecting hundreds of other firms acting in multiple tiers. These networks
have evolved to deliver global speed, efficiency, and responsiveness. At the same time, they are
complex systems which generate intricate patterns of interdependencies among the member firms
(Choi et al., 2001; Choi and Krause, 2006; Kim et al., 2011). In such systems, any particular
exchange occurs in the context of many other exchanges and events. The outcomes of any
individual firm, therefore, depend not only on its own performance or the performance of its direct
partners but also on the outcomes of many other indirectly linked firms. For example, quality
problems originating at a third-tier supplier can quickly reach the firm and propagate further
affecting its downstream partners. The interdependencies among firms in supply networks also
mean that their earnings and profits are interrelated (Hertzel et al., 2008; Pandit et al., 2011;
Patatoukas, 2012). Like quality problems or other types of supply and demand risks propagating
throughout a supply network, financial distress of one firm may cascade and eventually affect
many other firms interlinked through direct and indirect customer-supplier relationships. Supply
network, therefore, is becoming an important source of information for professionals involved in
the analysis and forecasting of firms’ financial performance.
The accuracy of such analyses and forecasts is critical for these professionals as well as for
the firms they study. Equity analysts, for example, are financial professionals who collect
information and conduct analyses to understand and predict stock price changes (Leins, 2018).
Investors frequently rely on their analyses and forecasts in making decisions to buy, sell, or hold
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a particular stock (Nagy and Obenberger, 1994; Womack, 1996). Analysts’ forecasts, therefore,
can often increase or cut short flows of capital, thus making firms prosper or perish (Leins, 2018).
As such, equity analysts are important intermediaries in capital markets. At the same time, equity
analysis is a field of intense rivalry as analysts compete fiercely with each other for investor
attention (Baum et al., 2015). Because more accurate forecasts attract more investors, equity
analysts strive to increase the accuracy of their forecasts. To achieve this, they collect and use
information from many different sources, including firms’ supply networks. Studies in the finance
and accounting literatures indicate that equity analysts who look deep into the firms’ supply base
to examine the performance of and the interdependencies among actors in the supply networks
achieve higher forecast accuracy (Guan et al., 2015; Luo and Nagarajan, 2015).
This is surprising because as analysts begin following along firms’ supply networks in
search for information, they are confronted with significant complexity. Extant studies of analysts’
forecasting behavior find that factoring complex information into the process of forecasting
increases the difficulty of the task, thereby reducing forecasting accuracy (Brown et al., 1987;
Haw et al., 1994; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Clement, 1999). But many analysts appear to be able
to successfully incorporate information from supply networks into their forecasts and improve the
accuracy of their forecasts. This suggests that analysts may follow certain heuristic rules enabling
them to pierce through the complexity inherent in supply networks. Studies of cognitive aspects
of information processing (e.g., Brashears, 2013; Brashears and Quintane, 2015) show that when
presented with a complex body of data, individuals are able to find patterns allowing relatively
simple generalizations. Finding patterns in complexity helps them to explain much with little.
Observing customer-supplier ties between firms in a supply network, for example, analysts can
discern patterns among these ties. Based on the observed patterns of ties, they can further grasp
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the underlying structural logic holding the network together and finally infer its general structure
(Janicik and Larrick, 2005; Brashears and Quintane, 2015). A general understanding of the
structure of a supply network and how the network’s parts are interconnected may help reduce the
complexity of the forecasting task because analysts would be able to factor the complex system
into simpler subsystems, analyze them individually, and then synthesize to infer the ways in which
the effects of positive and negative events occurring in different parts of the network may affect a
particular firm. We know little, however, about what properties might make the structure of a
complex network more cognitively accessible for an outside observer. This gap leads to our central
research question: how does supply network structure affect the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts?
Research on cognitive aspects related to how network information is stored and retrieved
from memory shows that human cognition detects some structural features better than others
(Brashears and Quintane, 2015). Structural elements that are easier for analysts to detect and store
in memory, therefore, may improve their perception of the network structure and facilitate more
accurate forecasts. Brashears and Quintane (2015) show that individuals tend to encode network
information primarily in terms of groups or clusters of ties rather than as individual dyads.
Remembering clusters of ties simplifies encoding and recall and reduces cognitive load while still
permitting an individual to grasp the structural logic of the network. Groups or clusters of ties,
therefore, are common structural configurations which individuals become aware of, process, and
store with less cognitive effort. In this research, I propose and empirically test the idea that supply
networks with relatively large numbers of ties grouped either in clusters or around prominent hub
nodes facilitate the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. I also examine the influence of an interesting
contrasting setting – supply networks with small-world structures – on the analysts’ predictive
accuracy. In such networks, there is a substantial number of ties among clusters, and this is likely
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to increase the difficulty of forecasting task by introducing a higher degree of interdependence
among clusters in the network.
Addressing our research question, I expect to make several important contributions. First,
I contribute to the growing body of literature on supply networks. Specifically, I show that supply
networks and their structural properties affect firms’ outcomes by influencing important
stakeholders such as equity analysts. Our findings suggest that the structural properties of supply
networks affect the accuracy of equity analysts in predictable ways. Second, I contribute to the
finance and accounting literature. Except for Guan et al. (2015), Luo and Nagarajan (2015), and
Hu et al. (2018), few studies address how supply chain information affects the accuracy of equity
analyst forecasts. However, identification of additional, important determinants of forecast
accuracy can be valuable to accounting and finance researchers, analysts, and investors who are
interested in obtaining more accurate firm performance forecasts.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. I proceed by providing the theoretical
rationale for linking supply network structure with the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts and develop
specific hypotheses about the ways in which several structural properties common to many
complex networks might affect the analysts’ predictive accuracy. Next, I describe our research
design regarding the data set and the adopted analysis approach. I then present and discuss the
results of our analyses and consider the implications for theory and practice. Finally, I consider
the limitations of our study and outline relevant avenues for further research.
Theoretical background and hypothesis development
Security analysts view supply networks as arenas where favorable or unfavorable events affecting
some firms can influence financial performance and shareholder value of their direct and indirect
partners. Financial situation at one firm may have implications for firms that are connected along
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the supply chain (Hertzel et al., 2008; Pandit et al., 2011; Patatoukas, 2012). Stock returns of
economically linked firms such as supply chain partners are correlated because of related
fundamentals and profits (Menzly and Ozbas 2010). Financial distress originating at one firm may
affect all of its partners. Financial distress may occur for various reasons. For example, studies
show that more firms experience financial distress due to poor management rather than the
viability of their business models or the strength of the demand for their products (e.g. Gilson,
1989; Whitaker, 1999).
For instance, in 2018, Tesla’s balance sheet showed a considerable amount of debt
(Higgins, 2018; Higgins et al., 2018). At the same time, Tesla’s CEO, Elon Musk, was criticized
for a number of business and personal decisions. Tesla’s stock returns showed a very high
volatility. As a result, the car maker’s cost of capital increased. It became increasingly more
difficult for Tesla to obtain liquidity from capital markets on its own. Tesla demanded its suppliers
to extend additional credit. The car maker needed to hold on to cash longer and thus delayed its
short-term payments. This, in turn, increased the suppliers’ own uncertainty. A supplier’s ability
to operate efficiently depends on whether it can receive stable cash flows from its buyers (e.g.,
Hendricks and Singhal, 2005). Unstable cash flows could prevent Tesla’s suppliers from financing
their own capital or labor, thereby impacting their profitability and adding uncertainty about future.
Liquidity-constrained firms often use their dependent suppliers as sources of liquidity. Dependent
suppliers often have to borrow to finance additional trade credit (Cunat, 2006; Garcia-Appendini
and Montiorol-Garriga, 2013), pinch funds used for hiring or investments, or raise prices to
squeeze other firms along the supply chain. Other ways in which dependent suppliers frequently
support their distressed buyers include allowing retrospective or late payments, offering extra
discounts (Cunat, 2006) or an opportunity to return unsold products (Gerchak and Wang, 2004).
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In extreme cases, suppliers dependent on a distressed firm may lose a large percent of their
revenue at once. Even if this does not occur, the suppliers’ stock returns are likely to experience a
higher volatility because stock returns of economically linked firms such as supply chain partners
are correlated due to related fundamentals (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008) and profits (Menzly and
Ozbas, 2010). Stock markets can negatively react to such distress when, for example, suppliers
commit into significant relationship-specific investments serving the needs of a particular buyer
and having limited resale options outside of the troubled exchange relationship (Banerjee et al.,
2008; Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Titman and Wessels, 1988).
The structure of a supply network determines the degree to which the distress of one firm
can cascade and affect other firms in the network. In a simple chain, if firm A is a supplier to firm
B, firm B is a supplier to C, and C is a supplier to D, then a distress in D can negatively affect the
entire chain. But modern supply networks are large, increasingly intertwined systems in which
small perturbations at a single firm can spread to many firms beyond the original firm’s chain. If
analysts are able to discern the underlying structural logic of supply networks, which is a key factor
influencing the transmission of financial risk (Basole and Bellamy, 2014), they can better predict
how favorable and unfavorable events taking place in the network will affect the firms they cover.
However, analysts must often produce forecasts within a time frame which is too short for a deep
analysis of complex patterns of interdependence among hundreds of firms comprising modern
supply networks (Leins, 2018).
Thus, when making forecasts, analysts do not examine the myriad of interdependencies
among individual firms in a supply network. They observe data on the suppliers of the firms they
cover as well as their suppliers’ suppliers and customers, and ask questions such as “Who is
connected to whom?” and “Who influences whom?” (Leins, 2018). As networks increase in size
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and complexity, these questions become difficult to answer. At this point, analysts must rely on
intuition to discern structural patterns among the observed interfirm ties. Research in cognitive
aspects of network perception (e.g., Janicik and Larrick, 2005; Brashears and Quintane, 2015)
shows that human cognition detects some structural patterns over others. When network ties adhere
to structural patterns which human cognition can easily detect, analysts can store, recall, and
incorporate in their forecasts a larger amount of information about interfirm interactions. If
analysts’ perception of the network structure is close to its actual structure, they will be able to
make better inferences about how events taking place in the network will affect the outcomes of
the firms they cover. Forecasts for firms with supply networks having easily identifiable structural
patterns, therefore, will be more accurate.
The ways in which humans encode and store network information in their minds determine
which structural patterns they become aware of (Simpson et al., 2011; Simpson and Borsch, 2005;
Kilduff et al., 2008). Cognitive and behavioral decision-making research shows that to encode and
represent interactions among multiple objects and make sense of patterns of these interactions,
humans rely on several basic mental frameworks, known as schemas or heuristics (DeSoto, 1960;
Freeman, 1992; Janicik and Larrick, 2005; Brashears and Quintane, 2015). For example, humans
frequently employ the so-called grouping schema to mentally encode and represent networks. The
grouping schema (Janicik and Larrick, 2005) is a heuristic leading individuals to attend primarily
to structures in which many ties are grouped together. Humans do not tend to encode relations as
individual dyads. Instead, they tend to notice groups of ties. Chunking is a similar heuristic
(Brashears and Quintane, 2015). Individuals tend to recall relations not as individual dyads but as
larger “chunked” substructures. They tend to abstract from individual ties between firms in a
network and search for grouping patterns in these ties. Therefore, structural elements within
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networks which group many ties together, for instance, hubs or clusters, are likely to be more
discernible to analysts.
a.) Hubs
In general, hubs are defined as nodes with relatively high degrees. The degree of a node is the
number of direct ties the node has with other nodes in the network. In the context of supply
networks, hubs are firms with large numbers of direct partners. As such, hubs are relatively more
connected with the rest of the supply network. Supply chain scholars assign hubs important roles
in supply networks (Yan et al., 2015). Hub nodes usually carry high supply, demand, and
informational loads. They are often among the most critical suppliers (Yan et al., 2015) or channel
leaders (Jarillo, 1988; Human and Provan, 2000; Hearnshaw and Wilson, 2013) providing systemwide coordination of the supply network.
Prominent hubs – the nodes with degrees that are very high relative to those of an average
node in the network – are easily identifiable structural elements in supply networks. Because hubs
participate in many interactions, they are very likely to appear frequently in the data which equity
analysts collect and use in their analyses. Hubs’ strong influence on the rest of the network means
that a change in the state of a hub node is likely to spread quickly across its numerous partners
(Barabasi and Bonabeau, 2003; Dezso and Barabasi, 2002). At the same time, hubs are exposed to
incoming risks from many other nodes. If a network has several hubs, a risk originating in any
node in the network will quickly reach at least one of these hubs. The hub then will pass the risk
to its numerous neighbors and eventually compromise other hubs, which will spread the risk
throughout the entire network. Stable hubs, on the other hand, contribute to the overall stability
of the network.
For analysts, prominent hubs may not only provide reference points around which most
other ties in the network are grouped, but also serve as barometers of the state of the entire network.
11

Changes in the states of prominent hubs indicate that similar changes in the entire network are
imminent. The higher the prominence of a hub relative to the rest of the network, the more visible
it is for analysts and the better reference it can provide to discern the future state of the network
without the need to analyze the intricate web of interdependencies among many other firms in the
network. Accordingly, I expect that the presence of prominent hubs in a firm’s network facilitates
more accurate forecasts of the firm’s outcomes. More formally,
Hypothesis 1. Greater prominence of hub nodes in a firm network is associated with more
accurate forecasts of the firm performance.
b.) Clusters
In complex networks, ties may be grouped not only around hubs but also in clusters. Clusters are
communities in which nodes are densely interconnected with each other (Borgatti, 1994; Borgatti
et al, 2018). These dense pockets of connectivity constitute “networks-within-networks” (Figure
1b) and can help simplify the analysis of the complex connection patterns common to supply
networks of large firms. First, these communities are rather visible and can be easily identified by
equity analysts. Second, they allow analysts to decompose the complex network into smaller
building blocks and analyze each block separately. Firms that form a densely connected cluster are
often coupled a lot stronger with each other than with the outside firms (Meade and Sarkis, 1998;
DeWitt and Guinipero, 2006; Sturgeon et al., 2008; Hearnshaw and Wilson, 2013). Dense clusters
often constitute functional subsystems or modules organized around a specific product or
manufacturing process. When large networks are organized into clusters of dense connectivity
which are rather sparsely connected with each other (Figure 1b), firms in different clusters usually
perform different functions.
Analysts can exploit the visibility and specialization of clusters to produce more accurate
forecasts. Simon and Ando (1961) define a nearly decomposable system as a system where the
12

links within subsystems are strong and the links between subsystems are weak and can be ignored
in the short run. In further works, Simon argues that near decomposability also plays a major role
in understandability of complex systems (e.g., Simon, 1991, 2002). Because of the difference in
the number of interactions within and between subsystems, one can usually obtain good
approximations of the short-run behavior of a given subsystem without considering the details of
the interactions in other subsystems. Making forecasts for a firm located in a clustered supply
network, analysts may employ a similar divide-and-conquer strategy and focus on the events
taking place in the firm’s neighborhood rather than attempt to grasp the effects of the entire system.
Because in clustered networks, the number of interactions among firms within the same cluster
greatly exceeds that of interactions among firms in different clusters, the short-run conditions in
each of the clusters are nearly independent of the conditions in the other clusters.
At the core of clusters are triads of nodes (Borgatti et al., 2018). The extent to which a
network is clustered is usually expressed by its clustering coefficient which is defined as the ratio
between the number of closed triads and the number of open triads in the network (Borgatti et al.,
2018). The clustering coefficient of a network measures the likelihood that two nodes connected
to the same third node are also connected to each other. High levels of clustering slow down the
dynamics of risk diffusion throughout the larger system (Newman, 2003, 2018; Buldyrev et al.,
2010). A relatively large number of closed triads implies that the possible routes of risk diffusion
are highly overlapping. Risk which originates in a node located in a dense cluster is more likely to
follow a closed loop to one of the already affected nodes in the same cluster, rather than travel to
a different cluster. Clusters, therefore, have quarantine-like effects on risk diffusion. This reduces
the forecasting difficulty as analysts need to consider mainly the effects of risks originating in the
firm’s own cluster.
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In clustered networks, most ties are between partners located in the same cluster.
Organizational scholars show that firms tend to economize on partner search and therefore prefer
to create ties with partners who are accessible being structurally close (Gulati and Garguilo, 1999;
Shipilov and Li, 2012; Zaheer et al., 2010). There is usually a richer array of background
information about capacities, needs, and reliability of more proximate potential partners. The
exchange of such information among organizations occupying structurally close positions also
tends to be richer leading to the development of mutual understanding, trust, and commitment
(Larson, 1992; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Garguilo, 1999). Closer partners are more predictable.
Clusters also provide such benefits as the reduction of opportunism through collective sanctions
for noncooperative behavior (Greif, 1993) and thus become attractive for firms even when there
are considerable opportunity costs in the form of forgone exchange opportunities with more distant
partners.
Networks with more clustered structures, therefore, provide analysts with several benefits
which reduce forecasting difficulty and facilitate the accuracy of forecasts. First, clusters are
usually easily identifiable structural elements. Second, analysts can focus only on the events within
the firm’s cluster and still produce a good forecast. Since clusters slow down the network-wide
diffusion of risks, analysts making short-term forecasts need only consider the risks emanating
from the firm’s own cluster. Third, by reducing opportunism and facilitating the development of
common behavioral norms, trust, and commitment, clusters promote homogeneity in performance.
Analysts can use other firms in the cluster as reference points in their forecasts. Hence, I
hypothesize that
Hypothesis 2. Greater clustering in a firm’s supply network is associated with more
accurate forecasts of the firm’s performance.
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c.) Small worlds
In many networks, large clustering coefficients are associated with large characteristic path
lengths. The characteristic path length of a network is the average shortest distance between any
two nodes in the network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). A large path length indicates that the
number of node-to-node steps required to travel from any one node in the network to any other is
large. This partially explains the effects of clusters on risk diffusion: in a more clustered network,
it takes longer for risk originating in a node in one cluster to reach a node in another cluster.
Conversely, smaller clustering coefficients are associated with smaller characteristic path lengths
and more rapid risk diffusion. In their seminal study, Watts and Strogatz (1998) found, however,
that under certain conditions networks may have very short path lengths and high clustering
coefficients. This means that despite high clustering, the number of steps required to traverse from
any one node in such networks to any other was quite small. These networks were obtained by
introducing a handful of additional cross-cluster ties into networks with large clustering
coefficients and large characteristic path lengths.
Watts and Strogatz (1998) showed that relatively few additional ties connecting nodes in
different clusters may significantly change the structure of the network turning it into a so-called
small world. Network theorists have since adopted the name “small worlds” to refer to networks
with relatively high clustering and small path lengths. Relatively more numerous inter-cluster ties
in small world networks dramatically reduce their path lengths but have very little influence on
the extent of clustering. Because the path length is low, diffusion is more rapid in small world
networks. Watts and Strogatz (1998) observe a strong sensitivity of diffusion dynamics to
increased number of inter-cluster ties. They show that a small increase in the number of intercluster ties can enable risks, innovations, ideas, technologies, or fads to spread much quicker
throughout the network. Analysts, however, may not notice the relatively small structural
15

difference between a highly clustered network and a small world network (Figure 1c). Because
such small difference in connectivity leads to a large difference in the dynamics of network-wide
risk diffusion, small world networks may negatively impact the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts.
The degree of small world connectivity in a network depends on the number of inter-cluster
ties: the higher the number of these ties, the greater the degree of small world connectivity (Watts
and Strogatz, 1998; Watts 2004). When analyzing and predicting the future performance of a firm
embedded in the network with a greater degree of small world connectivity, the analyst faces a
relatively more difficult task. He or she has to consider numerous additional variables because the
firm is exposed to risks emanating from multiple direct and indirect partners located in diverse
parts of the network. In the case of small world networks, analysts must also take into account
more complex and more rapid risk diffusion patterns. They no longer have the advantage of
decomposability because more numerous inter-cluster ties provide a tighter coupling among
clusters thus generating additional interdependencies. This increases the complexity of the
forecasting task if the firm is located in a small world network. The small world connectivity may
also distort analysts’ perception of the network structure. Observing a large number of ties grouped
in clusters, they may be drawn to rely on the grouping and chunking schemas and focus their
attention on the firm’s close surroundings. These heuristics are less effective in networks with
small world structures because they largely ignore the few but critical ties between clusters.
If small world networks have prominent hubs, however, most ties in these networks will
be between one of the prominent hubs and a node with a smaller degree. Many of the inter-cluster
ties will also belong to one of the hubs. In small world networks, therefore, hubs will aggregate
most of the risks traveling via both the within-cluster and between-cluster ties. For analysts, this
will provide an advantage. They can focus on prominent hubs as reference points to discern the
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risks which may affect the firms they follow in the near future. Changes in the states of prominent
hubs will suggest what analysts should look for in their analyses. In light of this reasoning, I
hypothesize that
Hypothesis 3a. Greater small world connectivity is associated with less accurate forecasts.
Hypothesis 3b. The presence of prominent hubs in networks with small world connectivity
will moderate the effect of these networks on the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts.
Empirical Context and Dataset Construction
In this research, I examine how the structure of a firm’s supply network affects the forecasting
accuracy of equity analysts. For this purpose, I constructed a dataset based on data from several
different sources. The dataset was constructed in several phases. In Phase 1, I obtained data on
buyer-supplier relationships from the FactSet Revere database. The FactSet Revere database
provides an extensive coverage of buyer-supplier links for a period from April 2003 to present.
The unit of observation in the FactSet Revere database is a buyer-supplier link between two firms.
FactSet Revere collects information on firms’ supplier and customer relationships from multiple
sources. First, it captures buyer-supplier relationships reported by firms in accordance with
Regulation SFAS 131 which requires firms to identify customers accounting for 10 or more
percent of their sales. Further, FactSet Revere complements this information with additional data
from SEC 10-K filings, corporate websites, press releases, investor presentations, analyst reports,
executive interviews, and other sources.
The period from July 2003 through December 2010 (30 quarters) provides a particularly
valuable opportunity to examine empirically how structural characteristics of supply networks
affect the accuracy of equity analysts’ forecasts both during the bull market (2003-2007) and the
bear market (2007-2010). It also covers both the boom cycle of the US economy and the global
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recession. Therefore, I chose this period as our period of interest. Next, using MATLAB, I
constructed a directed binary adjacency matrix At which reflects all buyer-suppler relationships
recorded in the FactSet Revere database in the 30 quarters of our period of interest. In this directed
binary adjacency matrix At, the entry in each cell aijt is one if firm i is a supplier of firm j in quarter
t, and zero otherwise. Using the adjacency matrix At I proceeded to Phase 2.
In Phase 2, I identified 25 firms operating in industries where the relationships between
buyers and suppliers have been shown to be marked by high importance and substantial degree of
joint dependence. These 25 firms are large manufacturers in aerospace and defense, electronics,
heavy machinery, machine tools, and consumer goods industries. These 25 firms are covered by a
substantial number of analysts. Using our adjacency matrix, I identified the set of direct (Tier-One)
suppliers for each of the 25 firms. I further identified the set of Tier-Two suppliers, which are
direct suppliers of the focal firms’ Tier-One suppliers. I repeated the process to obtain the full set
of suppliers in the vicinities of the 25 firms. The vicinities were bounded at Tier Five. In addition
to vertical (cross-tier) buyer-supplier ties, I identified all horizontal (within-tier) ties among these
suppliers.
The FactSet Revere database contains most data on buyer-supplier relations which equity
analysts could find in 2003-2010. Based on the FactSet Revere database, our dataset provides a
good representation of networks which equity analysts could potentially map and analyze in that
period. While I do not expect that analysts actually performed such analysis, our dataset provides
an approximation of what network structures analysts could potentially become aware of in 20032010. The supply networks which I mapped using the adjacency matrix had structures consisting
of dyadic, triadic and more complex configurations. These networks included not only
manufacturers of physical products but also firms playing vital support role in the transportation,
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storage, and transformation of these products as well as firms providing the necessary financial,
equipment maintenance, and other services (Carter, Rogers, and Choi, 2015). Overall, in Phase 2,
I obtained 25*30=750 firm-quarter network representations which included most data on buyersupplier relations available to analysts in 2003-2010. Firms’ supply networks are dynamic entities
as firms constantly add new ties and delete existing ones. Our network representations reflect the
resulting variability in structural properties which are posited to influence forecasting accuracy.
In Phase 3, I used the adjacency matrix to estimate the hub prominence, clustering
coefficient, and small world coefficient for each network in each quarter. The operationalizations
for these variables are described in Sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2, and 3.4.3 below. Then I retrieved
earnings-per-share (EPS) forecasts and actual values data from the I/B/E/S Detail History database
and calculated consensus forecasts made for each of the 25 firms in each quarter. A consensus
forecast measure is common in the finance and accounting studies. It is the average of all forecasts
made for a particular firm in the given period. In each period, individual analysts commonly make
several forecasts for the firms they cover, each forecast having a different horizon. A forecast
horizon is the distance in quarters between the quarter in which the forecast was made and the
quarter for which the forecast was made. Consensus forecasts are different for each horizon. For
example, if in quarter t analysts make forecasts for company i’s earnings two and four quarters in
the future, there will be two different consensus forecasts: one for the two-quarter forecasts and
one for the four-quarter forecasts.
Variables
Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is the accuracy of earnings per share (EPS) forecasts. Earnings per share
is the value of payments a shareholder will receive from a share of stock. The EPS value depends
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on the firm’s revenues and costs. Because risks emanating from the firm’s supply network also
affect both revenues and costs, changes in EPS reflect the effects of these risks on shareholder
value. For example, when an upstream supplier experiences financial distress and its delivery and
quality performance suffers, the focal firm may experience a greater amount of lost sales due to
unavailability of products or a greater amount of expenses to procure the products from new
suppliers. The decrease in sales and the increase in costs will decrease the EPS value.
Following studies of EPS forecast accuracy in the finance and accounting literatures, I
operationalize EPS forecast accuracy as the absolute value of the difference between the consensus
forecast of a firm's earnings per share and actual earnings per share, divided by the stock price at
the time when the forecast was made:

𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑡 = (−1) ∗ (

|𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖ℎ𝑡 − 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙|
)
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡

Multiplying the forecast error, which is measured by the difference between the forecast and the
actual EPS values, by (-1) gives a measure that increases with greater forecast accuracy. Thus, a
network property that is positively associated with the accuracy measure signals that the property
facilitates more accurate analysts' forecasts.
Independent variables
Using the adjacency matrix At I estimated the following set of independent variables for each
network in each quarter in the period under investigation. All variables were estimated using
MATLAB.
Hub prominence
In this research, I argue that more prominent hubs will be both more noticeable and more
influential in the network. The concept of network hubs is based on the measure of a node degree
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defined as the number of connections the node has with other nodes in the network. Hubs are
defined as nodes with degrees that are very high relative to other nodes in the network. Our
measure of hub prominence is operationalized as the ratio between the average degree of all nodes
in the network and the average degree of those nodes whose degrees are in the top ten percent of
all degrees in the network:

𝐻𝑢𝑏 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 =

𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡

This measure shows the extent to which the average degree of hubs exceeds that of an average
node in the network of company i in quarter t. A greater value of this measure means that hubs are
more recognizable and that more nodes are grouped around hubs.
Clustering coefficient
In network theory, clustering coefficient is defined as the ratio of closed to open triads in a network
(Newman, 2003; Borgatti and Everett, 2006):

𝐶𝑖𝑡 =

𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡

An open triad consists of three nodes connected by two ties. A closed triad consists of three nodes
which are fully connected. Clustering coefficient shows what percent of a firm’s direct partners
are connected to each other.
Small World Coefficient
In network theory, a small-world network is defined as one having a much larger clustering
coefficient than the random network of the same size and a characteristic path length
approximately equal to that of the random network of the same size (Watts and Strogatz, 1998;
Newman, 2003). Using this definition, I calculated the small world coefficient for each network
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using the random network baseline method, a staple approach in network studies. To obtain a
random network baseline, I randomized the entries of the adjacency matrices representing the
connectivity of each of the actual networks in our sample and calculated the clustering coefficients
and characteristic path lengths of the obtained random networks. This procedure was repeated 10
times for each quarter of the period under investigation, after which I calculated the average
clustering coefficient and characteristic path length of the 10 random networks. Then I calculated
the clustering coefficient and characteristic path length of each of the real network in each quarter.
The clustering coefficients of these networks were calculated using the formula described above.
The characteristic path lengths were calculated using the following formula (Borgatti et al., 2018):

𝐿 𝑖𝑡 =

1
∑ 𝑑𝑚𝑛 ,
𝑁(𝑁 − 1)

Where N is the number of nodes in the network of firm i in quarter t and 𝑑𝑚𝑛 is the length of the
shortest path between nodes m and n. Finally, the small world coefficient for each network at
quarter t was obtained using the following formula:
Small World Coefficient= (Cactual/Crandom)/(Lactual/Lrandom).
where Cactual is the clustering coefficient of the actual network, Crandom is the average clustering
coefficient of the set of 10 random networks, Lactual is the characteristic path length of the actual
network and Lrandom is the average characteristic path length of the set of random networks which
I generated.
Control variables
a.) Uncertainty
An important factor that affects the forecasting accuracy is the degree of uncertainty related to the
firm. To estimate the overall uncertainty around a firm, scholars in finance and accounting use the
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volatility of the firm’s stock returns. Because stock returns are affected by both firm-specific and
market-wide factors affecting the firm, the volatility of a firm’s stock returns is a comprehensive
measure of the overall uncertainty related to the firm. An increase in stock returns volatility is an
easily observed measure which analysts may use in their forecasts. Following extant studies, I
operationalize the quarterly volatility of stock returns as the standard deviation of daily stock
returns over each quarter. To estimate the volatility of a firm’s stock returns, I use the daily stock
return data from CRSP database.
b.) Forecast attributes
Other factors that affect forecasting accuracy include forecast horizon and the number of analysts
following the firm. Longer forecast horizons are associated with lower accuracy of analysts’
earnings forecasts (Brown et al., 1987; O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Brown, 1993). I operationalize
forecast horizon as the number of quarters between the quarter in which the forecast was made and
the quarter for which the forecast was made using the data from the I/B/E/S database. According
to previous research, analyst following increases forecast accuracy because analysts can learn from
each other’s forecasts. Further, I operationalize analyst following as the number of analysts whose
forecasts are included in the I/B/E/S database. Also, because forecasting difficulty may vary across
industries and across time, I include year and industry dummy variables. The industry dummies
are based on 4-digit SIC codes.
Model specification
To test our hypotheses, I use multiple regression and estimate the following equation:
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐻𝑢𝑏_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙_𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽4 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽8 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(1)
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Accuracyit is the accuracy of the consensus EPS forecasts provided by analysts for firm i in quarter
t. 𝐻𝑢𝑏_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 is the measure of hub prominence in firm i’s supply network in the
quarter preceding the quarter when the forecast was made. I use the measure of the preceding
quarter because analysts mainly observe records of buyer-supplier relations from previous periods.
𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙_𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡−1 are, respectively, the clustering coefficient and the small
world coefficient of firm i’s supply network in the quarter preceding the quarter when the forecast
was made. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is the volatility of firm i’s stock returns in the quarter preceding the
quarter when the forecast was made. 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the number of analysts following firm i in
quarter t. 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛 is the forecast horizon and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 are the dummies controlling
for the differences in forecasting difficulty across industries and time.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations between the variables in the model.
The correlation results indicate some preliminary support for the hypothesized relationships
between structural properties of supply networks and the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. The
correlation between hub prominence and the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts is positive and
significant (r = 0.1535, p < 0.05), as expected. The correlation between the clustering coefficient
and the forecasting accuracy is also positive and significant (r = 0.0453, p < 0.05). The correlation
between the small world coefficient and the forecasting accuracy is negative and significant (r =
0.0992, p < 0.05).
I performed the analyses in STATA 15. Before estimating the specified model, I accounted
for multicollinearity by mean centering all explanatory variables and ensured that the variance
inflating factor (VIF) values for each explanatory variable were below 10.
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== Insert Table 1==
Main results
In this study, I am interested in effects of supply network structure on the accuracy of equity
analysts’ forecasts. Model 1 in Table 2 tests the effects of each structural property covered in this
research on the forecast accuracy. In Model 2, I add the interaction between the measure of hub
prominence and the small world coefficient to examine the hypothesized moderating effects of
prominent hubs on the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts when the firm’s supply network has a small
world structure.
== Insert Table 2==
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive influence of the presence of prominent hubs in a firm’s supply
network on the accuracy of analysts’ EPS forecasts. The respective regression result in Model 1
supports this prediction (β = 0.0044, p<0.01). Hub prominence has a small but significant effect
on forecasting accuracy. Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive influence of clustering in a firm’s supply
network on the accuracy of forecasts provided by analysts covering the firm. The regression result
in Model 1 support this hypothesis (β = 0.1948, p<0.01). Among the three structural properties
covered in this study, clustering has the strongest positive influence on the forecast accuracy. This
suggests that grouping and chunking heuristics have a strong impact on analysts’ perception of
supply networks. They encode and store network information in terms of groups of ties.
Hypothesis 3a predicts a negative effect of small world connectivity on the accuracy of
analysts’ forecasts. The respective regression result in Model 1 provides support for this prediction
(β = -0.0686, p<0.01). Small world structures appear to hinder forecast accuracy. Hypothesis 3b
predicts a moderating effect of the presence of prominent hubs in a firm’s supply network on the
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impact of small world connectivity on the forecasting accuracy. Hypothesis 3b is also supported:
the coefficient of the interaction term in Model 2 is 0.0554 and p < 0.01. The interaction plot in
Figure 3 can enrich the interpretation of this moderating effect. In Figure 3, I plot the predicted
effects of small world structures on analysts’ predictive accuracy against the changes in the small
world property and hub prominence. I use high and low values of each of these variables as one
standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively.
The “Lower small world coefficient” line depicts the slope of the effect of small world
structure on forecasting accuracy when the value of the small world coefficient is set to one
standard deviation below its mean. The “High small world coefficient” line depicts the slope of
the effect of small world structure on forecasting accuracy when the value of the small world
coefficient is set to one standard deviation above its mean. Similarly, the “More prominent hubs”
mark refers to the value of hub prominence set one standard deviation above its mean and the
“Less prominent hubs” mark corresponds to the value of hub prominence set one standard
deviation below the mean. When hubs are more prominent, the negative effects of small world
structures are weaker, more so when the small world property is higher.
The overall picture painted by these results is that the structure of firms’ supply networks
affects the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. Equity analysts tend to produce more accurate forecasts
for firms with more clustered supply networks. Moreover, the presence of prominent hubs in a
firm supply network leads to slightly better accuracy. The influence of hubs on facilitating higher
forecast accuracy becomes stronger in networks with small world structures. While small world
networks tend to lower the accuracy of forecasts, prominent hubs in such networks attenuate this
impact. These results also suggest that grouping heuristics play an important role in analysts’
perceptions of actual supply network structures.
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Discussion
In this research, I leveraged a novel source of extensive data on buyer-supplier relations to examine
the relationship between the structure of a firm’s supply network and the accuracy of earnings
forecasts made by equity analysts following the firm. Our main finding is that analysts tend to
more accurately predict the earnings of firms with more clustered supply networks and networks
where hub nodes are more prominent. In contrast, analysts’ forecasting accuracy decreases when
the firm’s supply network has a small world structure Overall, our findings contribute to theory
and practice in several ways.
Theoretical implications
In this research, I find that supply network structure affects the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts.
Supply networks of many large firms have complex structures that present a cognitive challenge
for an analyst attempting to follow along a firm’s supply chain to obtain more information relevant
to his or her forecasts of the firm’s performance. Our study identifies some of the ways in which
analysts’ mind perceives, encodes, and represents these structures. Because analysts make
forecasts based on their perception of the network, not the actual structure, it is important to
identify which structures are relatively easier for analysts to perceive. I find that hubs and clusters
are associated with higher accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. Therefore, they are likely to be more
cognitively accessible for analysts.
Networks are becoming increasingly important for economic and social life. Scholars in
various disciplines have developed theoretical perspectives of interfirm network formation and
evolution as well as provided accounts of the numerous ways in which interfirm networks
influence organizational outcomes. In this study, I am exploring how interfirm networks influence
the outcomes of outside stakeholders such as equity analysts. In order to achieve superior forecast
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accuracy, analysts must perceive the complex network structures accurately. Identifying and
exploring the effects of structural elements which enhance or hinder individuals’ perceptions of
networked realities add new insights to our knowledge of how we can understand our social and
economic environments.
Managerial implications
Our research has implications for equity analysts and for managers of the firms which these
analysts cover. Our findings indicate that in their perception of supply networks, equity analysts
follow a certain set of heuristic rules. For example, they tend to become attuned to grouping
patterns of ties constituting supply network structure. Following this grouping heuristic, they
perceive some elements better than others. I find that the presence of prominent hubs and large
clusters in supply networks facilitates higher forecasting accuracy. This suggests that in the process
of seeking order in a complex system, analysts are predisposed to focus on dominant structural
elements. This makes sense because most ties in networks are grouped around prominent hubs or
in clusters. Focusing on dominant structural elements allows analysts to perceive complex supply
networks parsimoniously. At the same time, focusing on dominant elements, analysts fail to notice
important dynamics associated with less discernible elements. For example, the rapid dynamic of
risk diffusion in small world networks is based on the relatively few inter-cluster ties which may
elude analysts’ attention.
Managers of the firms covered by analysts should be aware of the special role which
dominant elements in the firm’s supply networks play in increasing the accuracy of analysts’
forecasts. Because analysts’ forecasting accuracy affects the firm’s financial position and standing
on capital markets, managers should engage analysts into discussions of the structural complexities
inherent in their firms’ supply networks. Our fieldwork shows that analysts are interested in
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learning more about supply networks because knowledge of firms’ supply networks allows them
to produce superior forecasts and compete for investor attention more effectively. In this regard,
managers may consider supplying analysts with specific information about supplier development
programs, relationships with critical or dominant suppliers, and other activities aimed at making
the firm’s supply base more stable. If a firm’s supply network is very complex, managers may
consider mapping the relationships among the supplier firms as an important step to increasing
analysts’ awareness and understanding of the patterns and structures of ties in the network. Such
visualizations would help managers to communicate more data about their firms’ supply networks
in order to aid analysts in overcoming their cognitive limitations and increasing forecast accuracy.
Limitations and directions for future research
Our study offers new insights for a range of research streams. At the same time, it has certain
limitations which suggest promising areas for future research. First, answering the call for deeper
analysis of firms’ structural embeddedness in supply networks, I solely focus on the structural
characteristics of supply networks. Future research may extend our analysis by including other
variables. For example, links between firms in supply networks may be assigned weights reflecting
the volume, strength, or criticality of the supplier-customer relations. Some suppliers may provide
components that are much more critical for the firm than others, and therefore should be more
closely followed by equity analysts exploring the firm’s supply chain. It is important to learn more
about how analysts encode strong or critical ties in their minds. In this study, I posited that analysts’
perception of networks is based to an important extent on grouping heuristics. They tend to attune
to ties grouped in certain patterns rather than individual dyads. However, in the case of strong or
critical ties, dyadic representation may be the optimal way to perceive complex networks. While
in this study I focused on the most widely studied heuristic which individual follow to make sense
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of complex patterns of relations, identification of other heuristics central to analysts’ perception of
networks will provide important insights allowing managers maximize the shareholder value of
their firms.
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Appendix

Figure 1. Supply network of Firm A with clusters in Tiers Two and Three (a); supply network of
Firm A with moderate small world coefficient (b); supply network of Firm A with high small
world coefficient and two prominent hubs (c).

Figure 2. The moderating effect of hub prominence on the impact of small world supply
networks on the accuracy of forecasts
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

1

2

3

4

5

6

Accuracy

-0.0063

0.0229

-0.5178

0

1

Hub Prominence

3.6111

0.4091

1.4145

4.6422

0.1535*

1

Clustering

0.0477

0.0098

0.0333

0.1271

0.0453*

-0.6109*

Small world

0.0861

0.0226

0.0693

0.3381

-0.0992* -0.2704*

0.5327*

1

Volatility

0.0181

0.0109

0.0048

0.1227

-0.5285* -0.2096*

0.0787*

0.1415*

1

Horizon

4.2054

2.1929

1

8

-0.0812*

-0.0009

-0.0108

0.0053

0.0149

Coverage

15.8565

7.7032

1

44

0.0249

0.2029*

-0.1745* 0.0877* 0.0571* 0.0564*

7

1

1
1
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Table 2. The Relationships Between Supply Network Structural Properties and Forecast
Accuracy
Dependent Variable = Accuracy
Model 1
Hub prominence

0.0044***
(0.0009)

Model 2
0.0051***
(0.0009)

Clustering coefficient

0.1948***
(0.0432)

0.2705***
(0.0526)

Small world coefficient

-0.0686***
(0.0156)

-0.0658***
(0.0157)
0.0554***
(0.022)

Hub prominence X Small world

Firm-specific uncertainty

-1.1071***
(0.0276)

-1.1082***
(0.0276)

Forecast horizon

-0.0008***
(0.0001)

-0.0008***
(0.0001)

Firm coverage by analysts

0.00018***
(0.00004)

0.00018***
(0.00004)

Industry dummy

0.00019
0.0002

0.00019
0.0002

Year

0.0001***
(0.00003)

0.0002***
(0.00003)

Constant

-0.0089***
(0.0014)

-0.0089***
(0.0014)

R2

0.2846

0.2956

N forecasts

4,663

4,663

Standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01
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ESSAY 2. THE ROLE OF PARTNER-SPECIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN SUPPLY
NETWORK CHANGE
Introduction
How do interfirm networks change when exchanges between firms become less predictable?
Interfirm exchange networks, for instance, supply networks, often become arenas of dynamic
tensions between partners. Business news media are quick to pick up a situation in which a
powerful buyer experiencing difficulties decides to take advantage of its suppliers. When Tesla’s
cash position dwindled in 2018 due to a high level of debt and struggles with launching massmarket vehicles, the cash-strapped auto maker pressed its suppliers to reduce prices and refund a
part of what it had already spent (Higgins, 2018; Higgins et al., 2018). It may also be a factor
beyond a large buyer’s control that exposes the dependent suppliers’ to uncertainty or risk. For
example, when the U.S.–China trade war lowered the demand for iPhones in China, Apple
experienced a considerable revenue shortfall and was forced to slash production orders, thus letting
the shock to reverberate across its supply network (Grocer, 2019).
For the dependent suppliers in such situations, the stakes are high and stress can build up
quickly. In Emerson's (1962) view, if a dependent exchange partner has potentially useful
resources, the powerful partner will increase the use of power and cut deeper into the dependent
partner’s resources. As unanticipated and undesired changes in a major buyer’s conditions lead to
the pileup of additional demands on the dependent suppliers, the suppliers may start seeking to
change their dependence status quo. Frequently, such change involves forming ties with alternative
buyers (Emerson, 1962; Cook and Emerson, 1978; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). This resource
dependence-based logic implies that a shift in uncertainty specific to a powerful exchange partner’s
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conditions may spur a flurry of new tie formation activity in the network as each dependent partner
seeks a new alternative. The new ties, in turn, can significantly alter the structure of the network.
The literature on interfirm network evolution, on the other hand, emphasizes the
embeddedness or reinforcing nature of existing network ties. Firms view embedded exchange ties
as instruments of uncertainty reduction, and thus tend to repeat ties with past partners (Podolny,
1994; Gulati, 1995a; Uzzi, 1997), to form new ties with partners of their existing partners (Baker,
1990; Uzzi, 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999), or to pair up with partners similar to themselves
(Lincoln et al., 1992; Podolny, 1994; Ahuja et al., 2009). An underlying assumption on which this
logic rests is that organizations tend to avoid forming uncertain ties. Pairing up with an unfamiliar
partner entails considerable uncertainty, while homophily, transitivity, and repeated tie formation,
which this stream of research considers to be the primary mechanisms of interfirm network
evolution, generate ties that are relatively more certain. In contrast to the resource dependence
logic, the embeddedness logic implies that the structure of the exchange network would not
undergo a significant change when exchange relations between partners become less predictable.
Newly formed ties will be predominantly local, contributing only to the density and stability of the
powerful partner’s cluster.
The purpose of this study is to reconcile these two views of network evolution and gain a
deeper empirical understanding of how interfirm networks alter their structure when exchange
between firms becomes less predictable. Many empirically observed networks have dynamic
architectures with pockets of densely interconnected local ties between similar actors, which are
sparsely linked together by ties that cut across the organizational space connecting dissimilar actors
who often have no history of prior relationships (Sorenson and Stuart, 2008; Baum et al., 2005).
These architectures are radically different from the dense, stable clusters of firms with similar
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characteristics and ties infused with a higher degree of trust, which would form if homophily,
transitivity, and tie repeating were the only tie formation mechanisms at work. This suggests that
firms attempting to form alternative ties to alleviate an increase in partner-specific uncertainty
consider a wider set of potential alternative partners than that implied by the logic of
embeddedness. Yet, many important questions remain unanswered – we do not know how firms
choose alternative partners, whether they prefer partners located in their close proximity to more
distant prospects, and which prospective partners – close or more distant – choose to reciprocate
their offer of a new tie. These choices, in turn, have direct implications for the network structure.
Choosing partners located in the firm’s own cluster increases the network density while choosing
more distant partners makes the network more small-worldly.
To explore the choices firms make when their major partners experience a change in
uncertainty, we focus our analytical lens on the changes in the rates of new tie formation and
existing tie deletion among firms with a common key exchange partner. Specifically, we focus on
tie formation and deletion rates of suppliers of large manufacturing firms. We examine how the
dynamics of new ties, which these suppliers form with partners located both within and beyond
the boundaries of their own clusters, change when the uncertainty specific to their large buyers
increases. Using a novel dataset offering an extensive coverage of buyer-supplier relations, we
probe deep into supply networks of large U.S. manufacturing firms to track the numbers of newly
formed and deleted ties over a seven-year period. A significant relationship between an increase
in uncertainty specific to a major actor and changes in the rates of new tie formation and deletion
among its dependent partners would support our contention that such uncertainty affects the
structures of interfirm networks in predictable ways. In this light, we seek to contribute to the
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progress in organizational scholars’ on-going quest for a comprehensive theoretical model of
interfirm network evolution.
Theory and hypotheses
Beckman et al. (2004) distinguish between firm-specific uncertainty and market uncertainty. Firmspecific uncertainty stems from sources that are unique to the firm. For instance, firms may
experience unique uncertainty when their business models become outdated (Beckman et al.,
2004). Other firms may have viable business models but carry excessive debt or suffer from
management problems (Opler and Titman, 1994). On the one hand, firms are compelled to take
action to reduce the new uncertainty they face. However, the rising uncertainty diminishes the
resources available for firms to act on this imperative. Cutting into the dependent partners’
resources becomes a tempting option. When Tesla carried a considerable amount of debt and
struggled with the launch of mass-market vehicles, its stock returns had a very high volatility
reflecting the uncertainty around the car maker. This, in turn, increased Tesla’s cost of capital. As
it became increasingly more difficult for Tesla to obtain liquidity from capital markets, the car
maker decided to squeeze its suppliers demanding to extend additional credit, refund a portion of
the earlier payments, and cut future prices (Higgins, 2018; Higgins et al., 2018). Moreover, Tesla
needed to hold on to cash longer and delayed the short-term payments.
Tesla’s actions increased the suppliers’ uncertainty. In general, a supplier’s ability to
operate efficiently depends on whether it can receive stable cash flows from its buyers (Hendricks
and Singhal, 2005). Unstable cash flows could prevent the suppliers from financing their own
capital or labor, thereby impacting their profitability. In fact, cash-strapped firms frequently use
their dependent suppliers as sources of liquidity. Suppliers often borrow to finance additional trade
credit for their major buyers (Cunat, 2006; Garcia-Appendini and Montiorol-Garriga, 2013).
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Besides borrowing, they may pinch funds used for hiring or investments, or raise prices to squeeze
other firms along the supply chain in order to accommodate the demands of the major buyer. Other
ways in which dependent suppliers frequently support their distressed buyers include allowing
retrospective or late payments, offering extra discounts (Cunat, 2006) or an opportunity to return
unsold products (Gerchak and Wang, 2004).
In extreme cases, suppliers may lose a large percent of their revenue at once. In less extreme
cases, the suppliers’ stock returns are likely to experience a higher volatility because returns of
economically linked firms such as supply chain partners are correlated due to related fundamentals
(Hong, Torous, and Valkanov, 2007; Cohen and Frazzini, 2008) and profits (Menzly and Ozbas,
2010). The finance literature shows that stock markets often react negatively when suppliers
commit into significant relationship-specific investments serving the needs of a particular buyer
and having limited resale options outside of the troubled exchange relationship (Banerjee,
Dasgupta, and Kim, 2008; Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Titman and Wessels, 1988). While dependence
on a powerful buyer may be unproblematic when conditions are certain (Pfeffer and Salancik,
2003; Pennings, 1981), the accumulation of uncertainty presses dependent firms to respond.
However, predictions regarding the nature of such response vary across theories.
The resource dependence logic of network change
The resource dependence logic (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) predicts a collective response
among firms in structurally equivalent, dependent positions. Emerson (1962) distinguished
between two forms of structural responses. One is adding alternative exchange ties to diversifying
cash flow risk across multiple buyers and thus reduce the impact of an increase in uncertainty
specific to one particular buyer. For example, in response to the increase in Tesla’s unique
uncertainty, Panasonic formed a new tie with Toyota to jointly market its batteries to new buyers
(Mochizuki, 2018). The other form is uniting the disadvantaged positions into a coalition to
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increase the power of each individual actor. In this case, the dependent suppliers create and
reinforce ties among themselves. For instance, several direct suppliers of Tesla united efforts to
raise concern about the car maker’s actions by filing a record number of claims.
The resource dependence logic predicts that a shift in partner-specific uncertainty sets into
motion a coping process prompting its direct partners to balance their dependence on the source
of uncertainty. These partners begin altering the patterns of relations in the network by creating
new ties, thereby changing the network structure, sometimes in profound ways. This perspective
emphasizes an individualistic approach centered on actors who have rational-choice incentives to
exchange. Because the survival of an actor depends on exchange with other actors in the network,
a change in the conditions of exchange entail a threat to the actor’s survival. In this context, the
stakes are high and there is a strain to change the dependence status quo.
The embeddedness logic of network change
In contrast, the network perspective emphasizes a less strained world in which exchange is
embedded within a structural or relational framework that promotes cooperation and reduces
opportunism. The logic of embeddedness (Gulati, 1995a; Uzzi, 1997) implies that structurally and
relationally embedded firms prefer to accommodate their exchange partners’ demands rather than
balance the power differential by creating ties with alternative partners. Mutual familiarity and
understanding which breed in close clusters enable and facilitate trust among exchange partners.
Moreover, such clusters are infused with rich background information about capacities, needs, and
reliability of other actors (Larson, 1992; Gulati, 1995b; Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000; Gulati and
Garguilo, 1999; Li and Rowley, 2002). Furthermore, clusters of close ties provide such benefits as
the reduction of opportunism through collective sanctions for noncooperative behavior (Greif,
1993) and thus become safe havens for firms. This increases the comparative costs and risks of
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forming new relationships with outsider actors (Garguilo and Benassi, 1999; Li and Rowley,
2002).
New tie formation entails considerable uncertainty stemming from imperfect information
about potential partners’ capabilities, resources, needs, and willingness to cooperate (Kogut, 1988;
Podolny, 1994; Gulati, 1995a; Oxley, 1997; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). The range of tie formation
mechanisms considered in the literature on interfirm networks is predominantly limited to
homophilous pairing with similar actors (Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi, 1992; Podolny, 1994),
or pairing with the partners of existing partners (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999), or repeating ties with
past partners (Podolny, 1994; Gulati, 1995a; Uzzi, 1997). These mechanisms underscore a strong
effect of social proximity and shared third parties on new tie formation and the tendency of firms
to rely on heuristic-based decisions in partnering (Uzzi and Gillespie, 1999). To economize on
partner search, firms tend to create ties with partners who are close and available (Gulati and
Garguilo, 1999; Shipilov and Li, 2012; Zaheer, Gözübüyük, and Milanov, 2010). Firms also tend
to select partners with whom they have some familiarity, either directly or indirectly, or through
prior partnerships (e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo 1999, Shipilov and Li 2012, Zaheer et al. 2010). This
preference favors local ties because firms can tap into a pool of referrals and background
information which a network of close ties can generate on prospective partners. The embeddedness
logic further implies that firms respond to an increase in partner-specific uncertainty by either
accommodating the partner’s demands or balancing by forming ties with close and familiar
partners, thus changing the network structure only marginally.
Framing network change
Research views network change as a process of interaction between two evolutionary elements,
new tie formation and existing tie deletion (Koka et al., 2006). Ties are the fundamental building
blocks of networks. Tie creation and deletion, therefore, are the fundamental units of analysis in
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network transformation. A marginal analysis of changes in tie formation and deletion rates,
therefore, can provide a comprehensive picture of network change. The additional amounts of
novel ties and deleted existing ties following a change in the uncertainty specific to an exchange
partner can explain the effects of this change on the structure of the network.
Insert Figure 3
Figure 1 provides an illustration. Firms B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I are immediate, or Tier-one,
suppliers of the focal firm A. Each one of these immediate suppliers have their own suppliers,
which constitute the Tier-two echelon of the focal firm’s suppliers. The Tier-two suppliers, in turn,
also have suppliers, which constitute the Tier-three echelon, and so on. For example, firm J is a
Tier-four supplier of the focal firm. In contrast to alliances, supply networks have directionality as
the product or service is transferred from suppliers to their buyers. Therefore, firm A’s supply
network is represented as a directed graph. All suppliers are located at a certain distance from the
focal firm. The shortest distance from the focal firm to each direct or indirect supplier is equal to
the supplier’s tier number. The path length between the focal firm and its immediate, Tier-one
suppliers is equal to one. The path length between the focal firm and the suppliers of its immediate
suppliers – the Tier-two suppliers – is equal to two.
When the focal firm A in Figure 1 (a) experiences an increase in unique uncertainty and its
Tier-one suppliers observe shifts in the rhythm of exchange, they begin considering changing their
dependence status quo. Finding alternative buyers is a direct way to make such change (Emerson,
1962; Cook and Emerson, 1978). These suppliers can find alternative buyers among their closest
neighbors, other Tier-one suppliers, thus benefitting from a greater circulation of background and
reputational information facilitated by proximity. They can also find new buyers among Tier-two
or Tier-three suppliers and even reach out to Tier-four or Tier-five suppliers. At the same time,
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they may consider terminating ties with some of their existing partners to redirect resources to
either accommodate A’s increasing demands or to cultivate new buyer ties. The Tier-one suppliers
consider all these actions simultaneously, and their final choice may include creating or deleting
one or more ties in their close proximity or at a more distant range. Figure 1 (b) illustrates the
choice of firm G. In response to an increase in the focal firm’s unique uncertainty, G has severed
its existing ties with F and I and established new ties with distant partners K, L, and M. Firm H
formed a new tie with firm F.
In making their choices, Tier-one firms face several constraints. First, there is uncertainty
and risk associated with entering a new partnership. In general, the farther the prospective new
partner is located, the less information the firm has about the prospect’s capacities, resources,
standards, or willingness to engage in opportunism. Second, there are structural constraints.
Because the number of exchange relationships a firm can feasibly form and maintain is limited, it
is harder to find a partner in close proximity if the neighborhood is already densely interconnected.
A large number of connections means that most firms in the neighborhood have an adequate
number of suppliers, and the value of adding a new tie may be limited or even negative. Clustering
may make potential partners less accessible as well. Clustering, or closure around a third party,
enhances stability of existing relationships by reducing opportunism (Coleman, 1990; Granovetter,
1985; Uzzi, 1997) and conflict (Krackhardt and Handcock, 2007). A substantial degree of triad
closure around a firm may limit its ability to form transitive ties because most potential transitive
ties are already realized. At the same time, it can contribute to a growing self-containment of a
cluster making it increasingly impenetrable for outsiders (Sytch et al., 2012).
Perhaps the most critical constraint is the extent to which resources available to firms are
plentiful or scarce. In their theoretical account of interfirm network transformation, Koka et al.
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(2006) use the concept of munificence to represent the availability of resources. In general,
munificence is the capacity of the environment to support the firm and its strategies (Dess and
Beard, 1984). Greater munificence indicates that firms have greater resources available for
building new partnerships. In contrast, lower munificence indicates that firms are limited in their
ability to create new ties or reciprocate a tie offer. In environments with lower munificence, firms
tend to reinforce their existing relationships rather than create ties with new partners (Galaskiewicz
and Shatin, 1981; Gulati, 1995a). Moreover, lower munificence may spur a higher dissolution of
weaker existing relationships to redirect the resources to stronger, more viable relationships. Thus,
strategic action and environmental munificence act in tandem in influencing structural changes in
interfirm networks. The individual effect of either uncertainty or munificence on network change,
therefore, is ambiguous. They shape the course of network transformation simultaneously and
interactively.
In our view, the resource dependence logic and the embeddedness logic are both essential
for an accurate account of structural changes occurring in interfirm networks. These logics are not
mutually exclusive. Rather, they coexist and jointly shape the trajectories of interfirm networks
transformation. We admit to both perspectives because firms’ individual self-interest, patterns of
relationships that connect these firms together, and the uncertainty which they face are often
intertwined in influencing the rates at which these firms form new ties and delete existing ones.
We further contend that the coexistence of the two logics can at times be marked by shifts in
dominance in guiding the processes of tie formation and deletion.
For instance, when exchange in a network is predictable, the relations among the firms may
be rather harmonious and firms may not experience a pressure to change the rates at which they
form new ties or delete existing ones. An increase in partner-related uncertainty, however, triggers
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stress toward balancing the power status quo. As exchange in the network becomes less certain,
firms are compelled to take steps to a new balance. In such context, forming more alternative
exchange ties becomes instrumental and the dominance in guiding tie formation shifts to the
resource dependence logic. Because the coexistence of the two logics implies their joint impact on
the structure of the network, we consider the relationship between them to be cooperative and
synergistic rather than competitive. The increasing influence of one logic does not reduce the
influence of the other. To balance their dependence on a partner experiencing an increase in unique
uncertainty, firms can form new alternative exchange ties or increase exchange with the existing
partners embedded in the same cluster. Therefore, both an increase in new tie formation consistent
with the resource dependence logic and a higher focus on preserving existing tie consistent with
the embeddedness logic are likely to take place. In light of this reasoning, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1. In response to an increase in uncertainty specific to a powerful exchange partner,
firms form more new ties and delete fewer existing ties in their networks.

The two coexisting logics are likely to exert differential influence on the rates of new tie
formation in different regions of the firms’ networks. Many empirically observed interfirm
networks have structures that are dynamic and far-reaching. These structures consist of clusters of
dense close connections, which are linked together by more distant, cross-cluster ties cutting across
the organizational space to connect dissimilar actors who often have no history of prior
relationships (Sorenson and Stuart, 2008; Baum et al., 2005). Such ties are relatively costlier and
more uncertain to form and maintain as they don’t entail the structural and relational benefits and
protections of close ties. Distant tie formation may be triggered by firms’ attempts to obtain non-
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redundant, unique knowledge and skill sets to promote survival in highly dynamic and knowledgeintensive settings such as microelectronics and telecommunications industries (Sytch et al., 2012).
Baum et al. (2005) found that low levels of performance relative to social or historical baselines
prompt investment banks to form ties with distant partners to increase their chances to uncover
new ideas and explore new options. Sorenson and Stuart (2008) show that organizations at times
form distant ties to seize fads and fashions’ time-sensitive opportunities for supra-normal profits.
Such structures provide an opportunity for firms to form new alternative ties both within
and beyond the boundaries of their own clusters. When a major buyer experiences an increase in
unique uncertainty, its entire Tier-one echelon of suppliers is likely to be affected. When a Tierone supplier attempts to balance the dependence status quo by forming a new tie with another Tierone supplier or its partner, it exposes itself to a new partner that is equally affected by an increase
in the uncertainty specific to the major buyer. Because the Tier-one firms and their direct partners
may all be in the same predicament facing uncertain cash flows, balancing will be effective when
new relationships are developed with partners located beyond the bounds of the Tier-one
proximity. Resources, knowledge, information, and uncertainty are heterogeneous between
network communities. Alternative partners in other parts of the network may not be impaired by
the focal firm’s actions at all or may experience their negative effects only indirectly and to a much
lower extent. As the increase in uncertainty specific to a major immediate partner shifts the
dominance in guiding new tie formation to the resource dependence logic, firms shift the emphasis
of their tie formation activity towards more distant partners. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 2. In response to an increase in uncertainty specific to a powerful exchange partner,
firms form new close ties at a lower rate and new distant ties at a higher rate.
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Changes in the rates of new tie formation in more distant parts of firms’ networks consistent
with the resource dependence logic can encourage concurrent changes in tie deletion rates
consistent with the embeddedness logic. Establishing new ties requires resources. A less
predictable future due to increasingly uncertain conditions of a major exchange partner, on the
other hand, requires tighter spending. In such times, firms are compelled to review their portfolio
of network ties in order to identify and reinforce the highly contributing ties and eliminate the
weakly contributing or non-essential ones. The elimination of non-essential or weakly contributing
ties allows firms to redirect the resources they use to maintain these ties to reinforce the stronger
ones or buffer themselves by holding more cash to continue operating when payments from the
focal buyer become uncertain.
Such strategy of deliberate reinforcement of the vital contributors and elimination of nonessential ties does not necessarily mean narrowing the size or scope of firms’ networks. A firm
may eliminate one existing tie to free up resources to create one or more new ties, thus keeping
the size of its network the same or even increasing it. This strategy would increase the overall rate
of tie deletion, and this increase would occur primarily in more distant parts of the network. Close
ties tend to be stronger, owing in part to greater information exchange and the development of
enforceable behavioral norms (Granovetter, 1985; Koka and Prescott, 2002, Koka et al., 2006).
They have stood the test of time and are likely to be of greater assistance when a need arises.
Distant ties, in contrast, tend to be weak. Thus, in their pruning efforts, firms will target distant
ties to a greater extent. In this light, the increasing influence of the resource dependence logic in
more distant parts of the network strengthens the impact of the embeddedness logic in closer
proximities.
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Hypothesis 3. In response to an increase in uncertainty specific to a more powerful exchange
partner, firms delete existing close ties at a lower rate and existing distant ties at a higher rate.

Overall, our hypotheses suggest an increase in tie formation and tie deletion dynamics
following an increase in partner-related uncertainty. A shift in uncertainty provides an impulse to
change the dependence status quo, and firms increase their rates of tie formation and tie deletion.
However, we predict that firms form more new ties and delete more existing ties in more distant
parts of their networks than in their close proximity. At the same time, they reinforce their existing
ties with close partners, thus building more tightly connected clique-like clusters to stabilize their
close proximity. The concomitant formation of distant ties increases the connectivity and
integration among clusters in the larger network making the network more small-worldly.
Empirical Context, Sample and Data
From a longitudinal perspective, testing our hypotheses requires tracking the numbers of ties firms
form and delete within successive intervals. In this research, we do so in the context of large-scale
supply networks. Specifically, we focus on how Tier-one suppliers of large manufacturing firms
change their rates of tie formation and deletion as these large manufacturers experience a change
in unique uncertainty. Our sample includes supply networks of 30 U.S. firms in aircraft,
electronics, heavy machinery, and machine tools industries. These industries require multiple
different inputs, thus the 30 focal firms must interact with a large number of various partners. In
fact, when we probe five tiers deep into their supply networks, the average number of firms in
these networks reaches 3,020. Our period of our interest is from April 2003 through September
2010 (30 quarters). This period includes stretches of economic growth and recession, which allows
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testing the effects of partner-specific uncertainty on firms’ tie formation and deletion dynamics
under both high and low munificence.
We mapped the supply networks using data on buyer-supplier relationships from the
FactSet Revere database. The unit of observation in the FactSet Revere database is a buyer-supplier
link between two firms. FactSet Revere collects information on firms’ supplier and customer
relationships from multiple sources. First, it captures supplier-customer relationships reported by
firms in accordance with Regulation SFAS 131 which requires firms to identify customers
accounting for 10 or more percent of their sales. Further, FactSet Revere complements this
information with additional data from SEC 10-K filings, corporate websites, press releases,
investor presentations, analyst reports, executive interviews, and other sources.
Using FactSet Revere data, we identified the entire set of buyer-supplier ties in the
vicinities of each of the 30 firms in our sample in each quarter. The 30 vicinities were bounded at
Tier five. The set includes both vertical (cross-tier) and horizontal (within-tier) buyer-supplier
ties. We further use this set to construct directed binary adjacency matrices At reflecting the
recorded ties in quarter t, where t=1, 2…30, representing the 30 quarters in the period under
investigation. In our directed binary adjacency matrices, the entry in each cell aijt is one if firm i is
a supplier of firm j in quarter t, and zero otherwise. Using the adjacency matrices, we estimated
the following range of dependent variables for each of the 30 networks in each quarter in the period
under investigation. All variables were estimated using MATLAB (the code is provided in the
Supplementary Materials).
Dependent variables
a.) New close ties
Our first dependent variable is the total number of new close ties formed by Tier-one suppliers of
the 30 focal firms in quarter t. We operationalize a new close tie as a tie connecting a Tier-one
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firm with a new buyer which was originally separated from the Tier-one firm by a distance less
than or equal to two. According to extant literature, a path length of two constitutes the bounds of
the observability horizon beyond which the uncertainty associated with the capacity and reliability
of potential partners drastically increases significantly lowering the likelihood of tie formation
(Baum et al., 2005, Li and Rowley, 2002). Close ties connect Tier-one suppliers with buyers
located in Tier-one, Tier-two, and Tier-three. Firms located in these tiers form the set of the most
likely potential partners for Tier-one firms searching for an alternative buyer to balance their
dependence on the focal firm.
b.) New distant ties
Our second dependent variable is the total number of new ties formed by Tier-one suppliers with
buyers in Tiers four and five. Firms in these tiers are less likely to become alternative buyers of
Tier-one firms than those located in Tiers one, two, and three. At the same time, they are less likely
to be affected by uncertainty specific to the focal firm due to considerable distance. Thus, they
represent attractive alternative options for Tier-one firms seeking to reduce the uncertainty
stemming from the focal firm.
c.) Total new ties
Our third dependent variable is the overall number of new ties formed by Tier-one firms in quarter
t. It is operationalized as the sum of new close ties and new distant ties.
d.) Close ties deleted
Our fourth dependent variable is the number of existing ties between Tier-one firms and buyers
located in Tiers one, two, and three, which are terminated in quarter t.
e.) Distant ties deleted
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Similarly, our fifth dependent variable is the count of existing ties between Tier-one firms and
buyers located in Tiers four and five, which are terminated in quarter t.
f.) Total ties deleted
The sixth dependent variable is the overall number of existing ties deleted by Tier-one firms in
quarter t. It is operationalized as the sum of terminated close and distant ties.
Independent variables
a.) Partner-specific uncertainty
Beckman et al. (2004) use the volatility of a firm’s stock returns as a proxy for the uncertainty
facing that firm. An increase in stock returns volatility is an easily observed measure which the
firm’s stakeholders may use to make judgments about the uncertainty specific to the firm.
However, this volatility may be caused by both firm-specific factors and market-wide factors. In
order to make the measure of firm-specific uncertainty more precise, we decompose the volatility
into firm-specific and market-wide elements. The firm-specific element is measured by the firm’s
idiosyncratic risk. The market-wide element is measured by the systematic component of the total
volatility of a firm’s stock returns. This distinction is important because firms may be exposed to
systematic, market-wide factors to a different extent, and this may obscure the firm-specific
uncertainty.
To estimate the total volatility of a firm’s stock returns, we use daily stock return data from
CRSP for the 30 firms in our sample. We measure the total volatility using the Fama-French fourfactor model, a staple approach in the finance literature. This model suggests that a firm’s stock
return is a function of four common factors and the idiosyncratic residual:
𝑟𝑖,𝑑 − 𝑟𝑓𝑑 =∝𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑀𝐾𝑇 𝑟𝑑𝑀𝐾𝑇 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝑟𝑑𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝛽𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷 𝑟𝑑𝑈𝑀𝐷 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑑

(1)
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The four common factors include the market return (𝑟𝑑𝑀𝐾𝑇 ), the difference in returns between small
and big stocks (𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐵 ), the difference of returns between high and low book-to-market stocks
(𝑟𝑑𝐻𝑀𝐿 ), and the return momentum (𝑟𝑑𝑈𝑀𝐷 ) which reflects the difference in returns between highly
performing and stocks and those with low performance. The residual 𝑢𝑖,𝑑 is a measure of firmspecific excess return. Our estimates of daily returns are excessive to the risk-free Treasury bill
rate (𝑟𝑓𝑑 ).
Using the daily stock price data from CRSP, we match the daily stock returns of the 30
firms in our sample with daily data for the four factors available from Ken French's web site at
Dartmouth (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/ pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). Then we
estimate Equation 1 for each of the 30 firms. The standard deviation of the daily residuals 𝑢𝑖,𝑑 over
each of the 30 quarters in the period under investigation measures the idiosyncratic component,𝜎𝜀,𝑖 ,
of the total quarterly stock return volatility. This idiosyncratic component is our proxy for firmspecific uncertainty.
b.) Munificence
The systematic component of the volatility of a stock price volatility – the firm’s systematic risk
– reflects the extent to which the firm is impacted by market or industry-wide factors, such as
downturns due to overall economic conditions, changes in government policy, adjustments in
interest or exchange rates, changes in energy prices, and the like (Brealey et al., 2008). We use
the average systematic risk for all firms in the CRSP database as a proxy for the munificence of
the larger environment in which the 30 firms in our sample and their suppliers operate. Because
the total stock price volatility is the sum of the idiosyncratic and systematic components, we
2
calculate the systematic component of the total variance, 𝜎𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑖
, by subtracting the quarterly

squared standard deviation of the residuals 𝑢𝑖,𝑑 from the quarterly squared standard deviation of
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2
stock returns. The square root of 𝜎𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑖
is the systematic risk for each firm in each quarter. To

obtain the value of munificence, we calculate the average systematic risk for all firms in the
CRSP database (10,284 firms) in each quarter and take its inverse,

1
𝜎𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑡

. This measure

characterizes the munificence of the larger environment. A higher average systematic risk 𝜎𝑠𝑦𝑠 in
the economy means that firms are less likely to experiment with new partners, and thus the
capacity of the environment to support new tie creation is lower.
Because the firms’ ability to form new ties is affected by the structure of the network in
which they and their potential partners are located, we included several independent variables
reflecting structural characteristics salient for new tie formation.
c.) Path length
In a network with a greater average path length, firms have fewer close partners. Therefore, they
have more opportunities to form close ties which are preferable to distant ties. At the same time, a
greater path length means that the information exchange between firms in the network is less rich
(Schilling and Phelps, 2007). This may also affect the dynamics of distant tie formation relative to
the rate of close tie formation. Therefore, we include this variable in our analyses. We calculated
the directed average path lengths for the 30 networks in each quarter using the formula:
Path length t =

1
𝑛

∑𝑖∈𝑁

∑𝑗∈𝑁,𝑗≠𝑖 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑛−1

,

where N is the set of all firms in the network; n is the number of firms in the network; 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the
shortest directed path from organization i to organization j in quarter t.
d.) Clustering coefficient
Based on extant studies of interfirm network dynamics (e.g., Greve et al., 2013), we expect that
higher clustering would make it harder for firms to establish distant ties. A higher clustering
coefficient indicates a greater degree of embeddedness. A firm that is structurally embedded in
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closed triads is less likely to reciprocate an offer of a tie from an outsider. Operationally, we define
clustering coefficient as the ratio of open to closed triads for the whole network (Borgatti and
Everett, 2006). In other words, clustering shows what percent of an organization’s partners are
connected to each other. Because supply networks have directionality, we calculate the directed
clustering coefficient using the Fagiolo (2007) formula:
Clustering t =

1
𝑛

1

∑𝑖∈𝑁 2

∑𝑗,ℎ∈𝑁(𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎𝑗𝑖𝑡 )(𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑡 + 𝑎ℎ𝑖𝑡 )(𝑎𝑗ℎ𝑡 + 𝑎ℎ𝑗𝑡 )
𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑛 )(𝑘 𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑛
(𝑘𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘𝑖𝑡 −1)−2 ∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝑎𝑗𝑖 𝑡

,

where N is the set of all organizations in the network; 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the status of a buyer-supplier link
between organization i and j: 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1 when organization i is a supplier of j in quarter t and zero
𝑜𝑢𝑡
otherwise; 𝑘𝑖𝑡
is the out-degree of organization i in quarter t, indicating the number of its buyers;
𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑖𝑡
is the in-degree of organization i in quarter t, indicating the number of its suppliers.

e.) Density
Because the relationship with a supplier entails certain costs, each organization has a limit in the
number of suppliers it can feasibly manage. Thus, network density indicates how close each firm
is to this limit. The higher the network density, the harder it is for firms to find a new customer.
We operationalize network density as the ratio of ties present in the network to the number of ties
possible. We estimate density in each quarter using the following formula:
𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 =

2𝑇𝑡
,
𝑛𝑡 (𝑛𝑡 − 1)

where Tt is the number of ties and nt is the number of organizations in the network in quarter t.
Our dependent variables are count variables (the number of new or deleted ties). Thus, in our
analyses we use negative binomial fixed-effects models. Negative binomial models correct for
overdispersion present in our data. They have been used in other studies of overdispersed counts
(Barnett 1997, Haunschild and Beckman 1998, Beckman et al., 2004).
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Results
Before estimating our models, we took several measures to mitigate multicollinearity. First, we
used the grand mean-centered values of all predictor variables. Second, we ensured that the
variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for each predictor variable were below a value of 10,
indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue in the given dataset. Each of the VIF scores for our
dataset met this requirement (mean score of 1.56) after we mean-centered the predictor variables.
We first report the descriptive statistics and simple correlations in Table 1.
Insert Table 1
The odd-numbered models presented in Tables 2, 4, and 6 test the direct effects of changes
in partner-specific uncertainty on the rates of various types of tie formation and deletion. Model 1
in Table 2 tests the direct effects of changes in partner-specific uncertainty on the total number of
new ties formed in the networks. Previous research (e.g., Nohria, 1992) argues for the pathdependency of network transformation: the rate at which firms form new ties in the current period
depends on the rate of new tie formation in the previous period. Similarly, the rate of new tie
formation may depend on the contemporaneous rate of tie deletion as firms may need to replace
the ties they delete with new ones. To control for these effects, Model 1 includes the net change in
the count of ties in the previous quarter and the number of ties deleted in the current quarter. Model
3 tests the direct effects of changes in partner-specific uncertainty on the total number of ties
deleted in the networks. Model 3 controls for the effects of the rate of tie formation in the previous
quarter and the contemporaneous rate of tie formation because the number of ties deleted may
depend on the number of new ties formed.
Models 5, 7, 9, and 11 presented in Tables 4 and 6 test the direct effects of changes in
partner-specific uncertainty on the number of close ties formed, the number of close ties deleted,
the number of distant ties formed, and the number of distant ties deleted, respectively. Model 5
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controls for the effects of the previous and contemporaneous rates of tie formation and deletion by
including the number of close ties formed in the previous quarter and the number of close ties
deleted in the current quarter. Model 7 does so by including the numbers of close ties deleted in
the previous quarter and formed in the current quarter. The rate of distant tie formation depends
on the rates of close tie formation, close tie deletion, and distant deletion in the current quarter as
well as the rate of distant tie formation in the previous quarter. Model 9 includes these variables
as controls. The rate of distant tie deletion, in turn, depends on the rates of close tie formation,
close tie deletion, and distant tie formation in the current quarter as well as the rate of distant tie
deletion in the previous quarter. Model 11 includes these variables as controls.
Insert Tables 2-7
The results of models 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 show that the direct effects of changes in
partner-specific uncertainty on the changes in the rates of tie creation and deletion are significant.
However, according to Koka et al. (2006), these direct effects may have ambiguous interpretations.
They must be estimated in interaction with environmental munificence. Models 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and
12 include the interaction term. The results show that the interactions are significant in all models.
To unpack the interactions, we performed marginal analyses of the impacts of changes in partnerspecific uncertainty on tie formation and deletion dynamics in environments with high and low
levels of munificence. The high level of munificence was set at one standard deviation above its
(mean-centered) mean and the low level of munificence was at one standard deviation below its
mean.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that firms respond to an increase in uncertainty specific to their
major buyer by forming more new buyer ties and deleting fewer existing buyer ties. The results of
the marginal analyses of the effect of changes in partner-specific uncertainty on the conditional
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means of newly formed ties and deleted ties (Table 3) reveal that firms’ responses differ
considerably between the high and low levels of munificence. Thus, a one-unit change in partnerspecific uncertainty is associated, on average, with 16.44 more new ties formed when the
munificence is high and 9.61 fewer new ties formed when the munificence is low. Similarly, a
one-unit change in partner-specific uncertainty is estimated to increase the average number of
deleted ties by 22.46 when munificence is high and decrease this number by 15.72 when
munificence is low. These results provide partial support for Hypothesis 1 and reveal that firms’
responses to shifts in partner-specific uncertainty change drastically between the high and low
levels of environmental munificence.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that firms respond to an increase in uncertainty specific to a
powerful exchange partner by forming fewer close ties but more distant ties. Our results show that
firms do form more distant ties in response to an increase in partner-specific uncertainty when
munificence is high (Table 7). However, our results show no effect of changes in partner-specific
uncertainty on close tie formation in high munificence conditions (Table 5, Model 6, p>0.05).
When munificence is low, firms decrease both close and distant tie formation. Hypothesis 3, in
turn, predicted that firms delete fewer existing close ties and more existing distant ties in response
to an increase in partner-specific uncertainty. The results of our marginal analyses of the
interaction terms in Models 8 and 12 (Table 5 and 7) show that when munificence is high firms
delete more of both close and distant ties. When munificence is low, however, firms delete fewer
close and distant ties. Overall, these results partially support Hypotheses 2 and 3 and provide
further evidence that firms can employ both the resource dependence logic and the embeddedness
logic in their responses to changes in partner-specific uncertainty, depending on the level of
environmental munificence.
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Furthermore, the results we obtained provide interesting insights about the enabling and
constraining effects of network structure on the rates of tie formation and deletion. Network
density powerfully constrains the rates of close tie formation and deletion but does not affect
distant tie formation rates. Clustering, on the other hand, increases the rates of close and distant tie
deletion but does not significantly influence their formation. Path length facilitates the rates of
both close and distant tie formation and deletion.
Discussion
To obtain a deeper understanding of how interfirm networks change, our research leveraged the
context of practical dilemmas which firms face when uncertainty specific to their major exchange
partners increases and exchange becomes less predictable. The choices firms make to resolve such
dilemmas expose several key processes relevant for our understanding of interfirm network
transformation that may remain invisible during more stable periods. Our results reveal shifts in
the dominant logic guiding tie formation and dissolution as the munificence of the larger
environment changes.
When munificence is high, firms’ responses to an increase in partner-specific uncertainty
are guided primarily by the resource dependence logic. We observe that in such conditions firms
respond by forming more ties with new alternative buyers. The majority of these new ties are with
distant partners. Because these partners are far enough from the source of uncertainty, they are
unlikely to be affected by its changes. An alternative tie with a distant partner, therefore, has a
higher utility as an instrument of uncertainty reduction than a tie with a closer partner. At the same
time, we observe an increase in the rate of close tie deletion, and this suggests that firms are
attempting to reduce their embeddedness in the cluster around the focal firm experiencing an
increase in uncertainty. This suggests that in such contexts firms emphasize their connections with
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distant buyers. As new distant ties are formed at a higher rate, the network becomes more smallworldly increasing the integration among tiers.
When munificence is low, however, the dominance shifts to the embeddedness logic.
Firms slow down their rates of new tie formation and existing tie deletion. While the declining
rates may in some instances be viewed as a threat-rigidity effect (Staw et al., 1981), we consider
them to be a result of a deliberate change in strategy. Lower environmental munificence makes
forming new ties to change the dependence status quo less appealing. First, firms have fewer
resources available to form new ties. Second, because firms are less prone to experimentation with
new partners when munificence is low, the chances that an offer of a new tie will be reciprocated
are lower. These two considerations suggest that the opportunity costs and the difficulty of forming
new ties in environments with lower munificence are higher. Third, while the magnitudes of the
increase in partner-specific uncertainty in our sample were sufficiently large to make the exchange
less predictable, they were not large enough to threaten the short-term survival of focal firms and
thereby lead to threat rigidity. Thus, our research provides evidence that when munificence is low
firms cope with increases in partner-related uncertainty by relying more on their embedded ties.
Furthermore, our results show that the rates of close tie deletion slow down faster than do
the rates of close tie formation. This leads to an increase in the density of the firms’ proximate
networks. At the same time, a different dynamic unfolds in more distant parts of their networks.
Firms delete more existing distant ties than they form new distant ties. This makes the Tier-one
group of firms less connected with firms in Tiers four and five. Structurally, this implies that the
network becomes less small worldly. The concomitant increase in the density of the Tier-one
firms’ close proximity increases the degree of these firms’ structural embeddedness. While higher
levels of environmental munificence activate deliberate, creative organizational action aimed at
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changing the dependence status quo, lower levels of munificence suppress the firms’ motivation
to restructure their networks. Firms prefer to stay in the comfort zone and relative certainty of their
existing ties and to form new ties predominantly with close neighbors or partners of their existing
partners.
Implications for interfirm network research
Our findings indicate that firms’ propensity to change the dependence status quo by restructuring
their networks varies with characteristics of the larger environment. In this light, our research alerts
scholars that the path of interfirm network evolution is likely to be nonlinear. In order to be able
to explain and predict structural transformations of interfirm networks, future studies of network
evolution must consider the effects of various contextual variables on the rates of tie formations
and deletions in interfirm networks. Extending the approach and theory developed in the literature
on interfirm networks into untested realms of such salient contexts as emerging uncertainty are
likely to yield new valuable knowledge. The literature on interfirm networks has considered
interfirm ties mostly as sources of benefits or opportunities. The role of ties as sources of
uncertainty or difficulties has not received concerted consideration. We show that when
uncertainty emerges within major exchange ties, a new dynamic of tie formation and deletion
unfolds in the network changing its structure. Due to the ubiquity of relational uncertainty across
organizational contexts (Singha and Van de Ven, 2005), its effects on the structure of interfirm
networks should not be assumed away in further research.
Our research provides insights about the ways in which existing structural properties of
interfirm networks influence the extent of their transformation. We found that, on average, firms
form more new ties and delete more existing ties in response to an increase in partner-specific
uncertainty in networks with greater path lengths. This suggests that networks in which partners
are, on average, farther away from each other undergo a larger structural change as a result of an
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increase in endogenous uncertainty. On the other hand, we found that the degree of clustering
significantly affects the rate of tie deletion and has no effect on tie creation. A higher clustering
may indicate a greater degree of solidarity among close partners, which may become a source of
collective pressure constraining firms from modifying of their dependence by forming alternative
ties and motivating them instead to drop weaker existing ties to redirect resources to accommodate
the demands of a major buyer which the cluster views as a common good.
Next, our research contributes to the small literature on the origins of distant ties. The
literature on distant ties shows that their formation is motivated by factors other than those
triggering the formation of the majority of organizational ties which are local (Rosenkopf and
Padula, 2008). The factors leading firms to create distant ties are relatively less known. At the
same time, distant ties are fundamental for network change because a handful of such ties can
transform the structure of a network turning it into a small-world (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). We
identify a new origin of distant ties. Our results show that such contextually ubiquitous phenomena
as an increase in uncertainty specific to a major exchange partner and the concomitant need to
balance the dependence may prompt firms to form new distant ties.
Practical implications
Our research provides managers with important caveats regarding power and its use in
interorganizational relations. Pfeffer (1981) argued that power is predominantly a structural
phenomenon: the existing structure of relationships in a network defines which actor is more
powerful. At the same time, a less powerful actor may increase its power relative to a more
powerful actor through finding alternatives outside the exchange relationship (Emerson, 1962).
The resource dependence logic rests on the assumption that a firm is always motivated to lessen
dependence on its present exchange partners. An increase in the uncertainty unique to a more
powerful firm may give its managers an impression that its suppliers will necessarily search for
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alternative partners and start developing new ties if they observe a change in the rhythm of
exchange. Such impression may lead the powerful firm to take actions to counter the suppliers’
gains in power.
While the impulse to balance may always be there, our research shows that firms do not
always act on this motivation. They do so when the larger environment is munificent enough to
support new tie formation, most new buyer ties are formed in more distant parts of the network.
Such ties are usually weaker, more uncertain, and costlier to maintain. They may be short-term,
short-lived options. In this light, while such restructuring may be beneficial for the focal firm’s
suppliers, it is not a serious threat to the focal firm’s power. Moreover, these new distant ties make
the network more efficient in circulating information and knowledge from more distant parts to
the focal firm. In a way, these new distant ties may even benefit the focal firm through an increased
inflow of new ideas and knowledge from other communities in the network.
When the environment’s munificence is lower, suppliers actually lower their rates of tie
formation, thereby relying on existing ties to cope with the shifts in the rhythm of exchange. These
shifts in tie formation emphasize the switch towards mostly heuristic-based decisions accentuating
homophilous pairing, engaging old partners, and forming ties with partners of existing partners as
major mechanisms of new tie formation. Suppliers prefer the comfort zone and relative certainty
of their existing ego-networks to forming ties with unknown partners. The structure of the network
solidifies the power of the focal firm.
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Appendix

Figure 3. Firm A’s supply network undergoes a structural change from Time 1 to Time 2 as
supplier G deletes its ties with firms F and I, and establishes ties with K, L, and M. At the same
time, supplier H establishes a new tie with F.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variable
Dependent Variables:
New close ties
New distant ties
Total new ties
Close ties deleted
Distant ties deleted
Total ties deleted
Independent Variables:
Partner-specific uncertainty
Munificence
Path length
Density
Clustering

Mean

S.D.

26.61
10.24
36.85
22.85
7.91
30.76

65.11
17.11
82.20
55.29
12.87
68.17

0.02
304.18
2.62
0.002
0.05

0.01
139.43
0.16
0.001
0.009

1

2

1.000
-0.408
-0.142
-0.029
0.043

1.000
0.274
-0.011
-0.057

3

4

5

1.000
-0.690 1.000
-0.676 0.635 1.000
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Table 2. Fixed-effects negative binomial regression models for the effects of partner-specific uncertainty on total tie
formation and deletion
Total new ties formed at t
Total ties deleted at t
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Variable
Partner-specific
uncertainty
Munificence

-8.588
(3.2008)

[0.007]

3.4132
(4.252)

[0.422]

-13.2593
(3.5853)

[0.000]

3.3709
(4.613)

[0.465]

0.0003
(0.0002)

[0.211]

0.0004
(0.0002)

[0.062]

0.0004
(0.0003)

[0.19]

0.0005
(0.0002)

[0.05]

0.1272
(0.0231)
2.2833
(0.3879)

[0.000]

Partner-specific
uncertainty X
Munificence

0.0868
(0.0207)

[0.000]

Path length

3.4425
(0.3608)

[0.000]

3.694
(0.3604)

[0.000]

1.8591
(0.3874)

[0.000]

Clustering

9.9766
(12.2197)

[0.414]

8.2701
(12.1748)

[0.497]

62.356
(13.0237)

[0.000]

55.8358
(13.047)

[0.000]

0.0033
(0.0002)

[0.000]

0.0033
(0.0002)

[0.000]

Total new ties formed
at t
Total ties deleted at t

0.0042
(0.0002)

N (network-quarters)

869

[0.000]

p-values are in brackets; standard errors are in parentheses

0.0041
(0.0002)
869

[0.000]
869

869

[0.000]
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Table 3. Average marginal effects of partner-specific uncertainty on total tie
formation and deletion
Total new ties formed

Total ties deleted

Model 2

Model 4

High munificence

16.4397

[0.013]

22.4645

[0.002]

Low munificence

-9.6131

[0.006]

-15.7226

[0.001]

p-values are in brackets.
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Table 4. Fixed-effects negative binomial regression models for the effects of partner-specific uncertainty on close tie
formation and deletion
New close ties formed at quarter t
Variable
Partner-specific uncertainty

Model 5
-9.3862
(3.5111)

Close ties deleted at quarter t

Model 6
[0.008]

Model 7

0.9155
(4.4925)

[0.84]

0.0801
(0.022)
3.404
(0.3786)

[0.000]
[0.000]

1.7136
(0.3933)

[0.000]

56.0825
(13.9811)

Close ties deleted at t-1
New close ties formed at t

Partner-specific uncertainty X
Munificence
Path length

3.1639
(0.3777)

[0.000]

Clustering

14.8869
(12.9938)

[0.252]

12.52
(12.954)

[0.33]

New close ties formed at t-1

0.0007
(0.0003)

[0.017]

0.0008
(0.0003)

[0.01]

Close ties deleted at t

0.0049
(0.0002)

[0.000]

0.0048
(0.0002)

[0.000]

Constant

-0.2905
(0.0653)

[0.000]

-0.2202
(0.0671)

[0.000]

869
N (network-quarters)
p-values are in brackets; standard errors are in parentheses.

869

-11.0491
3.7094

Model 8
4.3287
(4.7552)

[0.363]

0.1209
(0.0239)
2.1532
(0.3975)

[0.000]

[0.000]

48.8911
(14.0511)

[0.001]

0.0004
(0.0004)

[0.288]

0.0003
(0.0004)

[0.404]

0.0038
(0.0002)

[0.000]

0.0037
(0.0002)

[0.000]

-0.5627
(0.0696)

[0.000]

-0.4636
(0.0709)

[0.000]

869

[0.003]

869

[0.000]
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Table 5. Average marginal effects of partner-specific uncertainty on close tie
formation and deletion
Close ties formed

Close ties deleted

Model 6
High munificence
Low munificence
p-values are in brackets

12.9438
-11.1127

[0.061]
[0.004]

Model 8
22.4736
-13.816

[0.002]
[0.001]
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Table 6. Fixed-effects negative binomial regression models for the effects of partner-specific uncertainty on distant
tie formation and deletion
New distant ties formed at quarter t
Model 9
Partner-specific uncertainty

-7.2735

Existing distant ties deleted at quarter t

Model 10
[0.043]

(3.5896)

5.0906

Model 11
[0.286]

(4.7678)

Partner-specific uncertainty X
Munificence

0.0925

-10.3205

Model 12
[0.007]

(3.8501)

3.0225

[0.000]

(0.3698)
Clustering

6.8375

[0.000]

0.1344

[0.601]

0.0006

8.4364

[0.000]

[0.649]

0.0017

[0.514]

0.0063

-0.0099
(0.0013)

0.0401

[0.000]

[0.000]

47.4227

[0.000]

(13.5671)

[0.231]

[0.000]

0.001

[0.011]

(0.0003)
[0.000]

-0.0098
(0.0013)

[0.000]

(0.0033)
N (network-quarters)
869
p-values are in brackets; standard errors are in parentheses.

0.0225
(0.0023)
869

0.0079
(0.0021)

[0.000]

-0.0119

[0.000]

(0.0013)
[0.000]

Distant ties formed at t
Distant ties deleted at t

49.0948

1.7399
(0.3911)

(0.0014)

(0.0007)
Close ties deleted at t

[0.001]

(13.7143)

Distant ties deleted at t-1
Close ties formed at t

1.2918
(0.3893)

(12.9343)

(0.0013)

[0.000]

(0.0254)

(0.3741)

(13.0301)
Distant ties formed at t-1

3.3264

[0.239]

(4.8454)

(0.023)
Path length

5.702

0.008
(0.002)

[0.000]

-0.0115

[0.000]

(0.0012)

0.0111
(0.0011)

[0.000]

0.0109
(0.0011)

[0.000]

0.0289

[0.000]

0.0281

[0.000]

[0.000]
869

869
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Table 7. Average marginal effects of partner-specific uncertainty on
distant tie formation and deletion
Distant ties formed
Model 10
High munificence
Low munificence
p-values are in brackets.

18.9711
-8.7898

Distant ties deleted
Model 12

[0.01]
[0.025]

27.2596
-15.5473

[0.001]
[0.001]
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ESSAY 3. FIRMS’ INNOVATION AND SUPPLY NETWORK STRUCTURE: THE
DYNAMIC INTERPLAY
Introduction
When we think of where organizations obtain innovative solutions we usually think of
exceptionally creative leaders or teams of engineers armed with cutting-edge technology. Since
Schumpeter (1911), innovation has been understood as an effort and achievement of an individual
economic entity. A growing body of sociological literature and organizational studies indicates
that innovative breakthroughs often come from complex interaction among several interdependent
entities (Powell et al., 1996; Porter and Stern, 2001). In a similar vein, supply chain scholars
increasingly view a firm’s direct suppliers or buyers as sources of innovative ideas. This view of
innovation as a systemic phenomenon implicitly suggests that innovative firms reside in the
systems which are in some ways different from those where less innovative firms are located.
However, two firms with essentially the same set of suppliers may radically differ in terms of
innovativeness: take Amazon and Walmart as an example. Such contradiction shifts the focus back
to the individual firm and the individual qualities such as absorptive capacity, business model or
strategic orientation. On what grounds, then, do supply networks matter and how supply networks
of innovative companies differ from those of the less innovative ones?
Supply chain literature, where we might expect to find answers, mostly treats the network
concept as a metaphor and largely focuses on the ways firms engage their direct suppliers in
innovative projects or “pull” innovations from their suppliers (Wagner and Bode, 2014). As
products become more complex, manufacturers outsource more components and thus are exposed
to a wider knowledge base. Tapping this knowledge allows firms to focus more on their core
competencies and to economize on internal research costs (McIvor and Humphreys, 2004; Ragatz
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et al., 1997; Swink, 1999). Further, many direct suppliers have a first-hand knowledge of their
customers’ demands and therefore can offer innovative solutions that fit these demands
particularly well (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990; Ulaga and Eggert, 2006; Ellis et al., 2012; Wagner
and Bode, 2014). While supply chain scholarship recognizes supply networks as important sources
of innovative ideas, its focus on the actions of the focal firm and its direct suppliers provides only
a partial answer to the central questions of this study.
On the other hand, several studies in organization science shift the analytic lens from the
individual firm and its immediate surroundings toward the structure of the larger inter-firm
network and explore its enabling and constraining effects on the firm’s innovation output. For
example, Schilling and Phelps (2007) networks characterized by dense clustering enable a
relatively more efficient transmission capacity for information diffusion. At the same time,
nonredundant connections increase the reach within the network by shortening the distance
between firms. Therefore, firms embedded in interorganizational networks with both high
clustering and short average path lengths are likely to have a greater innovative output than firms
in networks that do not exhibit these characteristics. Bellamy et al. (2014) employ a similar
perspective to explore the relationship between such structural properties of supply networks as
accessibility and interconnectedness and the innovation performance of firms embedded in these
networks.
However, viewing firms’ outcomes primarily as a function of the structure of their supply
networks provides an incomplete and potentially misleading perspective because supply networks
are themselves shaped through organizational action: structural properties of supply networks coevolve with firms’ behavior. The Rowley et al. (2000) study, for example, shows that in slowpaced industries, such as steel industry, firms tend to form relatively closed networks. The tempo
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of innovation in the slow-paced industries is usually lower relative to that in the fast-paced
industries (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Orsenigo et al., 2001; Powell et al., 2005). In the
slow-paced industries, firms’ needs for information, knowledge or external skill sets are different
from those of firms in the more dynamic industries. Firms in the slow-paced industries have lower
incentives to seek access to complementary assets and knowledge of others in their networks, and
thus tend to form closed networks.
Therefore, to explore the central questions of this research, we combine both perspectives
and explore the dynamic interplay between a firm’s innovative agency and the structure of the
firm’s supply network. We adopt an open system view of supply networks. We also follow
Schumpeter (1934), Hargadon and Sutton (1997), Rogers (2003), and many other studies which
conceptualize innovation as the process of recombining such inputs as knowledge, information,
capabilities, or resources. This process is particularly effective when it involves multiple
heterogeneous inputs. As knowledge, information, skills and resources are often more
heterogeneous across network clusters than within them, firms pursuing innovation are likely to
form new cross-cluster ties, thus changing the structure of their supply networks.
We start in this direction by building upon Swindler’s (1986) distinction between “settled”
and “unsettled” times. During stable, “settled” periods, most firms may unproblematically employ
established practices and exploit existing competencies and other sources of competitive advantage
(Mudambi and Swift, 2014). However, with time, these resources wane in value, and firms’
innovative agency enters the stage. During these periods of upheaval, firms may seek access to
supplier innovations and technologies to update their product portfolios (Gianiodis et al., 2010),
improve the product design (Primo and Amundson, 2002), or reduce costs (Cooper and
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Yoshikawa, 1994). These periods of exploration may bring about considerable changes in the
structures of the firms’ supply networks as they are driven to build ties with new partners.
We anticipate that our examination of changes in the structure of firms’ supply networks
during periods when these firms ramp up their innovative activity will advance existing knowledge
in two major ways. First, the insights into the processes taking place in supply networks as a result
of innovative exploration of an individual agent will show whether and to what extent firms’
actions help explain the dynamics of their supply networks. Second, if buyer-supplier relations
indeed generate knowledge-sharing benefits, then it is important to understand why we observe
such heterogeneity in the ways these relations are structured. A deeper understanding of how
supply networks evolve and what factors contribute to systematic variation in their evolution will
allow connecting the emergent network structures to individual outcomes in a more compelling
way.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss supply
networks as complex systems, theorize individual innovative agency of a firm, and develop
hypotheses relating innovative agency to structural properties of supply networks. We describe
our method in Section 3 and our empirical findings in Section 4. In section 5 we discuss our results
and their implications for theory and practitioners.
Theoretical background and hypothesis development
Systems terminology has become commonplace in defining supply networks. In an early
conceptualization, Choi et al. (2001) view supply networks as complex adaptive systems situated
in and interacting with dynamic environments. In this perspective, supply networks are comprised
of a large number of interdependent agents linked together by buyer-supplier relations. However,
they are not simply the sum of these agents. Their structure to a large extent depends on the nature
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of interactions among the agents. For example, in a tightly coupled complex system, the
components are strongly interdependent, while a loosely coupled complex system can be divided
into subsets of tightly coupled components that are loosely connected to one another. Complex
feedback loops leading to self-reinforcing cascades of changes affect tightly and loosely coupled
systems in different ways (Poole, 2014). This leads to nonlinear relationship between causes and
effects in such systems as well as to adaptivity manifested in self-organization and emergence. A
supply network emerges with no one firm deliberately organizing and controlling it (Choi et al.,
2001).
However, supply networks do not evolve in a random way. There are common patterns of
behavior among the agents comprising them leading to common structural properties. As systems,
supply networks are likely to evolve to optimize a specific set of competitive criteria, which
regularly includes a high efficiency of product and information transfer and low cost of
transactions and connection among firms. If minimization of transaction costs was the exclusive
priority, supply networks’ structures would resemble a regular lattice because this structure has
minimal number of links between the interconnected components and each link entails a cost of
establishing and maintaining. If global efficiency was the only criterion, the networks would be
close to the random network archetype which maximizes the number of long-range links
connecting distant parts of the network. Because supply networks are likely to evolve to optimize
both criteria, they can be expected to have relatively short path lengths, which are necessary for
global efficiency of product transformation and information transfer.
At the same time, we can expect supply networks to exhibit a relatively high degree of
clustering. The high clustering is necessary for achieving cost efficiencies through specialization.
Moreover, we can expect supply networks to be sparsely connected, especially between clusters.
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Their dense local clustering and short path lengths minimize the costs related to establishing and
maintaining network ties and at the same time support the complexity required to produce modern
multicomponent products. Such locally clustered and at the same time extensive configurations
can effectively support production and distribution systems is paired with relatively low
connection and transfer costs.
Although supply networks are systems comprised of interdependent agents (Choi et al.,
2001), the concept of agency in such systems has not yet received a concerted attention. Systems
theories are primarily founded on the premise that processes are causally influenced by outside
factors including the structure of the system in which the company operates (Poole, 2014). In fact,
most studies applying network perspective examine the influence of structure on operational
outcomes. Outside the literature on agent-based modeling, the nature and systemic consequences
of intentions and actions of individual components has not been explored. Agency theory applies
to situations in which an agent is acting for a principal, not to the context of interdependent
relations among components of a system. Agency is a unique construct that has always been a part
of inter-firm networks. Yet, it remains undertheorized and is often assumed away or becomes
merged into other concepts.
We argue that individual agency and actions are important for understanding what supply
networks are and how they come into existence and what structural properties they have.
Ultimately, supply networks are the outcomes of strategic, deliberate actions of multiple firms.
These firms form ties with partners to address specific needs. As these needs shape the partnering
behavior of firms in a network, different network structures emerge. We contend that at the core
of firms’ choices of partners is the fundamental tradeoff between the benefits and costs of new
network ties. For example, reliable, continuous collaboration is often a primary objective for firms
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seeking exchange partners. Therefore, the moral hazard stemming from a new relationship is a key
factor shaping such firms’ ties (Gulati, 1995a). The costs of search for a reliable partner, however,
are high as information about potential partners is distributed unevenly throughout the network.
Thus, firms seeking reliable, continuous collaboration will tend to pair with those about whom
they can obtain private information in a cost-effective way such as through shared third-party ties
(Gulati, 1995b). Because a shared third party may also intervene in conflict situations and act to
reduce opportunistic pursuits (Larson, 1992), such partners are especially attractive for many
firms. Such firms, therefore, will tend to form dense and rather closed networks with the partners
of existing partners or past partners. This tendency is further reinforced by a relatively faster
diffusion of reputational insights in close networks which reduces opportunistic behavior (Greif,
1989; Ahuja, 2000) as well as precludes releasing confidential information and technology to
outsiders or leakage of skills, experiences, and competencies that may form the basis of the firm’s
competitiveness.
Following Poole (2014), we conceptualize agency from a systems perspective by focusing
on responsiveness and meaningfulness of an agent’s actions. Agency is an issue of responsiveness
to external and internal cues – changes in the larger environment, actions of exchange partners or
own pressing needs. Another important feature of agency is the degree to which an agent
reflexively accounts for and monitors its actions relative to the processes taking place in the system
(Poole, 2014; Brummans, 2017). For example, deliberative problem solving processes in which
the agent compares alternative solutions involve such reflexivity and monitoring. Agency is to a
large extent defined an agent awareness of other agents and their resources (Poole, 2014). The
agent displays a higher degree of agency if it sees other firms in a supply network not just as nodes
or objects but as agents in and of themselves.
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Overall, in the context of a supply network, individual agency means a deliberate and
meaningful action based on an interpretation of the larger environment as well as actions of other
agents comprising the network. Such actions usually have a problem-solving dimension which
includes drawing on previous experiences in determining how choices fit the agent’s goals (Poole,
2014). Most importantly, to exercise agency, the agent is aware of being an agent, an autonomous
entity that is able to act within the system’s structural constraints (Poole, 2014; Brummans, 2017).
For example, the agent must be aware that it can undertake a network action – form a new tie or
set of ties – to reconfigure the surrounding structure to ease its constraints. Agency is about intent,
not about final results. The complexity of supply networks introduces a probability of unintended
and unanticipated consequences these creative interventions may result in (Choi et al., 2001).
Innovation is often viewed as a process of recombinatory search (Fleming, 2001; Schilling
and Phelps, 2007), a problem-solving activity in which innovators discover new solutions by
searching for and recombining existing solutions or knowledge (Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Schilling and Phelps, 2007) or finding new ways to combine existing knowledge elements
(Henderson and Clark, 1990). The competitive advantage of an innovative firm critically depends
on access to and recombination of novel inputs. When building network ties, innovative firms,
therefore, act with a goal to obtain continuous access to new and diverse information, knowledge,
or skill sets. As a firm’s supply network may become a source of such resources, innovative firms
see the links with their direct or indirect partners as channels of information and knowledge. In
this sense, the need to innovate provides a generative capacity – the potential to engage with the
existing supply network structure in a certain way. For example, innovative firms may be
motivated to form ties with companies outside their own cluster. These distant ties are more
uncertain and riskier than close ties but they can benefit innovative firms by providing fresh
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information or knowledge (Baum et al., 2005). Thus, the need to innovate activates a different type
of agential dynamic which may in turn produce a network with specific properties.
Reaching out beyond the boundaries of their own cluster and building ties with new
partners not connected to any firm in the cluster, innovative firms are able to tap diverse pools of
technical knowledge and information (Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014). This agential dynamic
relies on a distinct level of situational awareness. Innovative firms frequently other firms’
innovation activities, including new product announcements and patent grants. Since innovation
depends on new and unique information, innovative firms are actively seeking to form ties with
new partners. These new ties are weak ties but they work to channel unique, novel information
and knowledge. This is especially important when firms are unable to solve the problems they face
with resources in their existing network.
However, this may be true only for very innovative firms. Most firms are unlikely to build
risky new ties during periods of stability when they can exploit the existing competencies. The
innovative agential dynamic rarely enters the stage during stable and predictable times as firms
seek to maximize the current value of their existing resource endowments and refine and improve
their methods of production and execution (Benner and Tushman, 2003). During stable times,
therefore, the structure persists and constrains agency permitting only incremental adjustments.
The periods of stability are often followed by intervals of change as existing resources eventually
wane in value (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006; Miller and Friesen, 1984; Romanelli and Tushman,
1994) or competitors come up with superior products (Klepper, 1996). During these unstable
times, most firms are compelled to pursue innovations in order to adapt to changes in the value of
their competitive advantage and regain stability. This is when their innovative agency assumes a
prominent role and drives risk-taking, experimentation, and innovative search.
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As firms move from exploitation mode to exploration mode as the value of their extant
sources of competitive advantage begins to wane, their new agentic orientation may generate
several structural changes in their supply networks. The most likely change is an increase in
network size.
Focused on seeking new information, new knowledge, or skill sets firms form new ties
bringing new partners into their networks. Such new partners may be specialist firms contracted
to provide their specific expertise to solve problems. They may also be alternative suppliers if
firms are seeking to improve the lead times or reduce product costs. If firms are focusing on
developing new product offering, the new partners become main suppliers. In any case, the size of
the supply network is expected to increase. At the same time, firms that have been more focused
on exploiting their existing resource base rather than on developing new solutions face a more
formidable challenge as they move into exploration mode because more innovative firms are likely
to already have a broader access to a more diverse knowledge base in their supply network.
Therefore, we expect less innovative firms to increase the size of their supply networks to a larger
extent as a result of innovation. More formally:
Hypothesis 1. An increase in a firm’s innovative activity leads to an increase in the size of
its supply network, and this increase is larger for firms that are generally less innovative.
We also expect other structural changes to emerge. Besides bringing in new firms into the
network, firms may form ties with suppliers of their current partners in order to cooperatively seek
innovative solutions to technological problems or develop new products. The firms are more
familiar with partners of their current partners than with firms outside of their networks. Moreover,
such cooperation may work to loop in their current direct suppliers in innovative triads. The new
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denser connectivity creates transmission capacity to share large amounts of information (Burt,
2001; Schilling and Phelps, 2007).
As firms in the network become interconnected via multiple paths, both the volume and
reliability of diffused information increase enabling richer information and knowledge exchange
and integration. Firms can compare the inputs coming from multiple sources and choose the best
option or identify and remove distortions (Schilling and Phelps, 2007). This also leads to a more
effective collective problem solving (Powell et al., 1996). A higher density couples a deeper
collective understanding of the problem with a higher degree of mutual trust which develops in
densely interconnected clusters based on shared group identity (Coleman, 1988, Granovetter,
1992) and reciprocity norms (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Connecting with the partners’ partners is
also effective because it ensues a higher willingness to exchange information and knowledge.
Thus, building connections with the deeper-tier suppliers may provide access to tacit knowledge
(Hansen, 1999, Zander and Kogut, 1995). While innovative companies constantly tap the
knowledge stored in their supply networks, less innovative companies may quickly get access to a
considerable pool of new knowledge by connecting with their suppliers’ suppliers. For less
innovative companies, this pool is largely untapped, and they may benefit by increasing the density
of the connections in their network. In light of this reasoning, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2. An increase in a firm’s innovative activity leads to an increase in the density
of its supply network, and this increase is larger for firms that are generally less innovative.

While an increase in density provides a greater information access and deeper collective
understanding of the problem, it often makes information and knowledge in the network
homogeneous and redundant (Burt, 2004; Granovetter, 1973). The new paths connect actors who
are close to each other and source their information from the same sources. An increase in density
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may therefore stifle the diversity of information and knowledge required for effective
recombination. The norms, standards, and conventions adopted in dense clusters of partners tend
to homogenize the available knowledge. Katz and Allen (1982) describe the Not-Invented-Here
syndrome as an example of such homogenization. To increase the diversity of inputs, firms facing
the need to innovate reach out and create ties with partners located in more distant clusters. The
formation of such spanning ties is likely to create shorter path lengths among firms in the network
and increase its global interconnectivity. Shorter path lengths to a wider range of firms ensures a
greater diversity of available information, knowledge, or skill sets. Schilling and Phelps (2007)
show that networks combining high within-cluster density and short path lengths may significantly
enhance the creative output of member firms.
The average number of links that separates each pair of firms in the network also impacts
information diffusion. The speed of information transfer as well as the degree of information
distortion are directly related to the path length separating two firms. Watts (1999) shows that in
networks with shorter average path lengths, the diffusion of information and knowledge occurs
more rapidly and with more integrity. Thus, creating ties with partners located in distant parts of a
firm’s supply network benefits the firm as it can reach more information that is more diverse. At
the same time, it reduces the path lengths in the network thus enabling the firm to reach more
diverse information quicker and with less risk of distortion. Firms that are more innovative are
likely to have such spanning ties already established. The less innovative firms, however, have the
knowledge potential of distant regions of their networks largely untapped and therefore would
benefit more from such ties. As they introduce such cross-cluster ties into their network, they may
reduce the path lengths to a larger extent than the more innovative firms which are likely to already
have many of these ties established. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
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Hypothesis 3. An increase in a firm’s innovative activity leads to a decrease in the average
path length in its supply network, and this decrease is larger for firms that are generally
less innovative.
The concomitant formation of ties with the partners’ partners in the same cluster and more
distant cluster-spanning ties may create a change in the structure of the entire network making its
clusters more interconnected globally as firms are able to reach one another through relatively
shorter paths. The new within-cluster ties will keep the network clustering at the pre-innovation
level but now they will work to facilitate information and knowledge exchange between
organizations located in the same cluster. In contrast, the new cluster-spanning ties provide
efficient access to nonredundant information and novel resources that are typically unavailable
through within-cluster ties (Burt 2005). As firms engage in a broader search for information and
knowledge derived from otherwise disconnected groups of actors, these otherwise risky and
uncertain ties spanning distant clusters will endure and the network will become more smallworldly. A small-world network combines a relatively high degree of clustering with relatively
short path lengths: any two actors in such network are connected by a surprisingly small number
of intermediaries.
The incentives to pursue cross-cluster ties are always significant for highly innovative
firms, whose competitive advantage rests on the ability to continuously access and recombine
diverse information, knowledge, and other resources. To survive, such firms must be connected to
clusters containing unique knowledge via distant ties enabling effective knowledge transmission.
In general, their networks are more small-worldly than those of less innovative firms. Thus, we
expect the formation of new ties will change the small-worldliness of less innovative firms to a
larger extent as they move into exploration mode. More formally:
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Hypothesis 4. An increase in a firm’s innovative activity leads to an increase in the small
world coefficient of its supply network, and this increase is larger for firms that are
generally less innovative.

Empirical setting and sample
We test our hypotheses in the context of large-scale, global supply networks. In such networks,
the nodes are organizations engaged in industrial production and distribution of goods and
services. The links are the buyer-supplier relationships among these organizations. Every
organization in such networks has direct suppliers or buyers. These immediate partners have their
suppliers who, in turn, procure from their own suppliers. In this regard, supply networks
interconnect firms with multiple tiers of suppliers. The structural and relational interactions among
the firms form dyadic, triadic and more complex configurations which jointly constitute the global
network structure. Many global companies are embedded in supply networks connecting several
tiers consisting of thousands of firms in various industries. Such networks include not only
manufacturers of physical products but also firms playing vital support role in the transportation,
storage, and transformation of these products as well as firms providing the necessary financial,
equipment maintenance, and other services (Carter et al., 2015).
Supply networks are directed networks as the product or service is transferred from
suppliers to their buyers. Therefore, in this study we represent them as directed graphs centered on
a firm of interest, the focal firm. All supplier firms in these graphs are located at a certain distance
from the focal firm. The shortest distance from the focal firm to each direct or indirect supplier
represents the supplier’s tier. The path length between the focal firm and its immediate, Tier-1
suppliers is equal to one. The path length between the focal firm and the suppliers of its immediate
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suppliers is equal to two. The Tier-1 suppliers and connections among them constitute the focal
firm’s ego network. Firms located in Tier 2 are direct suppliers of Tier-1 firms, and firms located
in Tier 3 are these suppliers’ suppliers.
To test our hypotheses, we selected 45 firms with vastly global supply networks and
operating arena. These firms are in industries where suppliers can become sources of technology,
product, or process innovations. The industries include heavy machinery, automobile and aircraft
manufacturing, electronics, medical device and equipment production as well as food and
consumer goods. Such industries are interesting because they often experience market
unpredictability and put a greater pressure on member firms to collaborate with partners and use
the flow of information and knowledge in their supply networks to innovate.
The period of our interest is 30 quarters from April (Quarter 2) 2003 to September (Quarter
3) 2010. This period is interesting because it includes both the boom and bust cycles and may
include a range of innovative behaviors.
Using the patent data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), we
divided the 45 firms in our sample into three categories based on the count of patents each firm
applied for in the period under investigation. We labeled the bottom 15 firms by patent applications
count as Type 1 firms. They are the least innovative in our sample. We further labeled the middle
15 firms by patent applications count as Type 2 firms. They are more innovative than Type 1 firms
but less innovative than Type 1 firms, the top 15 firms by patent application count. According to
Bellamy et al. (2014) logic, inventions can be used to track back a firm’s knowledge creation
activity. Inventions instantiate the accumulation of knowledge used to generate novel solutions
from a given set of resources.
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We obtained data on buyer-supplier relationships of the 45 firms in our sample from the
FactSet Revere database. The FactSet Revere database provides an extensive coverage of buyersupplier links for a period from April 2003 to present. The unit of observation in the FactSet
Revere database is a buyer-supplier link between two firms. FactSet Revere collects information
on firms’ supplier and customer relationships from multiple sources. First, it captures suppliercustomer relationships reported by firms in accordance with Regulation SFAS 131 which requires
firms to identify customers accounting for 10 or more percent of their sales. Further, FactSet
Revere complements this information with additional data from SEC 10-K filings, corporate
websites, press releases, investor presentations, analyst reports, executive interviews, and other
sources.
Variables and dataset construction
Using FactSet Revere data, we identified the entire set of buyer-supplier ties in the vicinities of
each of the 45 firms in our sample. The 45 vicinities were bounded at Tier 5. The set includes
both vertical (cross-tier) and horizontal (within-tier) buyer-supplier ties. We further use this set to
construct a directed binary adjacency matrix At reflecting the recorded ties in quarter t, where t=1,
2…30, representing the 30 quarters in the period under investigation. In our directed binary
adjacency matrix At, the entry in each cell aijt is one if firm i is a supplier of firm j in quarter t, and
zero otherwise. Our multi-step analytical procedure is rooted in graph theory and matrix algebra.

Step 1: Using the adjacency matrix At we estimated the following properties for each of the 45
networks in each quarter in the period under investigation. All variables were estimated using
MATLAB.
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a.) Network density. We operationalize network density as the ratio of ties present in the
network to the number of ties possible. We estimate density in each quarter using the
following formula:
𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 =

2𝑇𝑡
,
𝑛𝑡 (𝑛𝑡 − 1)

where Tt is the number of ties and nt is the number of organizations in the network in quarter
t.
b.) The directed characteristic path length for each network was calculated using the
following formula:
1

∑𝑗∈𝑁,𝑗≠𝑖 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡

𝑛

𝑛−1

Lt = ∑𝑖∈𝑁

,

where:
N is the set of all organizations in the network;
n is the number of organizations in the network;
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the shortest directed path from organization i to organization j in quarter t.

c.)

Small World Coefficient. Following Kogut and Walker (2001) and Baum et al. (2003), we

define a small-world network as one having a much larger clustering coefficient than the random
network of the same size (Cactual > Crandom) , and a characteristic path length approximately equal
to that of the random graph of the same size (Lactual ~ Lrandom). Using this definition, we calculated
the small world coefficient for each network using the random network baseline method. To
obtain a random network baseline, we randomized the entries of the adjacency matrices
representing the connectivity of each of the actual networks in our sample and calculated the
clustering coefficient and characteristic path length of the obtained random network. This
procedure was repeated 10 times for each quarter of the period under investigation, after which
we calculated the average clustering coefficient and characteristic path length of the 10 random
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networks. Then we calculated the clustering coefficient and characteristic path length of each of
the real network in each quarter. Finally, the small world coefficient for each network at quarter
t was obtained using the following formula:

Small World Coefficient= (Cactual/Crandom)/(Lactual/Lrandom).
The directed clustering coefficients for actual and random networks were calculated using Fagiolo
(2007) formula:
Ct =

1
𝑛

∑𝑖∈𝑁

1
2

∑𝑗,ℎ∈𝑁(𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎𝑗𝑖𝑡 )(𝑎𝑖ℎ𝑡 + 𝑎ℎ𝑖𝑡 )(𝑎𝑗ℎ𝑡 + 𝑎ℎ𝑗𝑡 )
𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑛 )(𝑘 𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑖𝑛
(𝑘𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘𝑖𝑡 −1)−2 ∑𝑗∈𝑁 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝑎𝑗𝑖 𝑡

,

where:
N is the set of all organizations in the network;
𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the status of a buyer-supplier link between organization i and j: 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1 when
organization i is a supplier of j in quarter t and zero otherwise;
𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑘𝑖𝑡
is the out-degree of organization i in quarter t, indicating the number of its buyers;
𝑖𝑛
𝑘𝑖𝑡
is the in-degree of organization i in quarter t, indicating the number of its suppliers.

The directed characteristic path lengths for actual and random networks were calculated using the
formula described in part b above.
Step 2: Based on the results of Step 1, we constructed a separate matrix for each of our three
categories of firms. As each category consists of 15 firms, we obtained a separate 30x15 matrix
for each network property in each category.
Step 3: Using matrices obtained in Step 2, we calculated the change in each network property ∆𝑋 𝑖
from quarter to quarter during the period under investigation:
𝑖
𝑋𝑡+1
− 𝑋𝑡𝑖 = ∆𝑋 𝑖
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where X is either network size, density, characteristic path length, or small world coefficient and i
is either Type 1, Type 2 or Type 3 category.

Step 4: In this step, we calculated the mean of each network property over the period of 30 quarters:
𝑖
∑30
𝑡=1 𝑋𝑡
< 𝑋 𝑖 >𝑡 =
30
and then normalized ∆𝑋 𝑖 by dividing it by the mean property:
̃=
𝑿

∆𝑋 𝑖
< 𝑋 𝑖 >𝑡

Step 5: In this step, we identified quarters in which firms in our sample moved from exploitation
mode to exploration mode. We identified these quarters based on Mudambi and Swift (2014)
finding that changes in R&D expenditures away from a firm’s historic trend indicate transitions
between exploitation mode and exploratory innovation mode. To identify these periods, we first
obtained data on each firm’s quarterly R&D expenditures and sales from Compustat. Then we
normalized R&D expenditure values by dividing them by sales. To get the historic trend, we used
the smoothing spline. Quarters in which the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales was above the
historic trend obtained using smoothing spline were periods when firms started exploratory
innovation. Figures 4-6 illustrate the results for Type 1-3 firms respectively.
= Insert Figure 4=
= Insert Figure 5=
= Insert Figure 6=
Further, for each of the three categories of firms we constructed innovation period matrices using
the following rule:
𝑅&𝐷
𝑅&𝐷
) > (
)
{
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1 𝑖𝑓 (
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Thus, for each category of firms we obtained a 30x15 innovation period matrix I containing zeros
and ones.
̃ and 𝑰 and analyzed the distribution of the nonzero
Step 6: In this step, we multiplied matrices 𝑿
entries in the resultant matrices.
These six steps allowed us to measure the changes in network properties in quarters immediately
following the start of an exploratory innovation period.
Results
Our main analytical objective in this research is to compare the changes in the structural properties
of supply network of firms with different levels of innovativeness as they unfold an innovation
project. To achieve this objective, we measure these changes and compare the distributions of their
values in each of the three categories of firms. Comparing the distributions allows to identify a
bias toward decreasing or increasing a property among firms as they begin an exploratory
innovation. Figures 7 and 8 provide visual representations of the dynamics of the changes in the
characteristic path length and density in the supply networks of Type 1 (least innovative) firms.
Figures 9 and 10 do so for Type 2 (mid-innovative) firms and Figures 11 and 12 provide the
representations for Type 3 (most innovative) firms in our sample. These are descriptive
representations for the dynamics occurring as a result of an innovation effort.
= Insert Figures 7 – 12 =
Our Hypothesis 1 predicts that an increase in a firm’s innovative activity leads to an
increase in the size of its supply network, and this increase is larger for firms that are generally
less innovative. The distributions of the changes in network size for the three types of firms in our
sample are shown in Figure 13. We observe a bias toward increasing the network size among Type
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1 (least innovative firms). The mean increase for this category is 1.3%. We also observe a bias
toward decreasing the network size among Type 2 (mid-innovative firms): the mean decrease is
1.8%. Type 3 (most innovative) firms do not display a bias. Their mean increase is, however, 0.8%.
We used t-test to examine whether the differences in mean changes of network size among these
categories are significant. The results of the t-test at 10%-confidence level suggest a significant
difference between Type 2 and Type 3 firms (p = 0.048). However, the direction of changes is
opposite to what Hypothesis 1 predicts. The differences in mean changes of network size between
Type 1 and Type 3 firms as well as between Type 1 and Type 2 firms are not significant (p = 0.146
and 0.821, respectively). Therefore, our results do not support Hypothesis 1.
=Insert Figure 13=
Hypothesis 2 predicts that an increase in a firm’s innovative activity leads to an increase in
the density of its supply network, and this increase is larger for firms that are generally less
innovative. The distributions of the changes in network density for the three types of firms in our
sample are shown in Figure 14. We observe a bias toward increasing the network density among
Type 2 firms. At the same time, we observe a decrease in network density among Type 1 and Type
3 firms. The mean increase for Type 2 firms is 1.7%. The mean decrease among Type 1 and Type
3 firms is 3.9% and 1.8% respectively. The t-test results suggest that the difference in means
between Type 1 and Type 2 firms is significant at 10%-confidence level (p=0.064). The difference
in means between Type 2 and Type 3 firms is also significant at 10%-confidence level (p=0.068).
The difference in means between Type 1 and Type 3 firms is not significant (p=0.35). Overall,
these results provide a partial support for Hypothesis 2. In many cases, the network density
increases and it increases more for relatively less innovative firms.
=Insert Figure 14=
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Hypothesis 3 predicts that an increase in a firm’s innovative activity leads to a decrease in
the characteristic path length in its supply network, and this decrease is larger for firms that are
generally less innovative. The distributions of the changes in the characteristic path length in
supply networks of the three types of firms in our sample are shown in Figure 15. We observe a
bias toward decreasing the characteristic path length among Type 2 firms and a bias toward an
increase of the characteristic path length among Type 1 and Type 3 firms. The results of the t-test
suggest that the difference in mean changes of the characteristic path length between Type 1 and
Type 2 firms and Type 1 and Type 3 firms are not significant (p= 0.158 and 0.581, respectfully).
The difference in means between Type 2 and Type 3 is significant at 10%-confidence level
(p=0.072). These results provide a partial support for Hypothesis 3. In many cases, the less
innovative firms decrease the characteristic path length in their network to a larger extent than the
more innovative firms. This is evident in the difference in the changes of the characteristic path
length between Type 2 and Type 3 firms.
=Insert Figure 15=
Our Hypothesis 4 predicts that an increase in a firm’s innovative activity leads to an
increase in the small world coefficient of its supply network, and this increase is larger for firms
that are generally less innovative. The distributions of the changes in the small world coefficient
of the three types of supply networks are shown in Figure 16. We observe a greater bias toward
increasing the small worldliness of the supply network among Type 2 firms than among Type 3
firms. The results of the t-test suggest that difference in the mean increase of small world
coefficient between Type 2 and Type 3 firms is also significant (p=0.045). Type 1 firms, however,
display a bias toward decreasing the small world coefficient. The differences in means between
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Type 1 and Type 2 and Type 1 and Type 3 firms, however, are not significant (p=0.244 and 0.329)
respectively. These results provide support for Hypothesis 4.
=Insert Figure 16=
To gain a deeper understanding of the processes taking place in supply networks as focal
firms engage in innovative activities and to explain the surprising findings, we analyzed the
dynamics of the population in each of the five tiers of the supply networks under investigation.
We observe different patterns in partnering behavior among the three types of firms. Thus, the
least innovative (Type 1) firms increase the size of their immediate partners (Figure 17). This
suggests that as they unfold an innovative project, they tend to partner with an outsider firm, most
likely a specialist able to provide specific expertise. The specialist firm brings into the supply
network its own partners and the partners’ partners, thus increasing the size of the focal firm’s Tier
2 and Tier 3. On average, the distant tiers of Type 1 supply networks, such as Tier 4 and 5 do not
change much.
=Insert Figure 17=

Very innovative firms (Type 3) act differently. On average, they do not choose to partner
with newcomers. Moreover, they tend to drop some of their direct partners as they embark on an
innovative project. Instead, they rely on their distant partners to form new ties, thus increasing the
size of Tier 4 and 5. This increases the size of their network. It also slightly increases the
characteristic path length because the structural changes occur away from the majority of the
existing connections. This explains the surprising finding that the characteristic path in the supply
network of Type 3 firms actually increases, on average, as they engage in innovation.
This also provides an additional insight into why the small-world coefficient does not
increase much for Type 3 firms. The small-worldliness of a network critically depends on the
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presence of long-range ties spanning the tiers. Instead of creating long-range ties themselves, Type
3 firms rely on their indirect partners to do so. This suggests that very innovative firms not only
actively engage the structure in which they are embedded but also rely upon their relational
embeddedness to motivate distant partners to form additional ties in order to obtain the needed
expertise or skill sets.
Discussion
The overall picture painted by our results is one of deliberate innovative behavior shaping the
structure of firms’ supply networks. We theorize that partnering behaviors of innovative firms
differ from those of less innovative firms and that this difference engenders different changes in
the structure of their supply networks. Our results trace the changes in supply network size, density,
characteristic path length, and small-worldliness to differences in inherent innovativeness of the
focal firm.
We observe that when less innovative firms undertake a significant innovation project, they
tend to connect with new partners in order to source new knowledge or skill sets. Doing so, they
tend to form direct, strong ties which are usually based on legal arrangements, such as
nondisclosure agreements or exclusive licensing contracts (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). More
innovative firms tend to tap the potential of their weak and indirect ties by inducing their suppliers
to partner with outsiders in order to source the needed knowledge and resources. Innovative firms,
therefore, have supply networks with a wider reach. When faced with a need to mount up
innovation efforts, innovative firms turn to sources other than their suppliers or the suppliers of
their suppliers. Less innovative firms, in contrast, prefer to keep a narrower knowledgetransmitting reach of their supply networks. This suggests that less innovative firms have the
knowledge potential of their supply networks tapped to a much less extent.
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Theoretical contributions
Our main point is that the structure of supply networks is influenced by deliberative, agential
dynamic stemming from an individual actor. We show that agency is not just constrained by the
structure in which the agent is embedded but can also change the structure to make it more
conducive for certain desired outcomes. We provide evidence of such dynamic interplay between
agency and structure in which one constitutes the other. Our results suggest that firms often act as
customers in the market of buyer-supplier partnerships choosing partners based on pressing needs.
Thus, innovative firms tend to complement their proximate networks with relational arrangements
with more distant partners. Less innovative firms prefer to bring new partners into the bounds of
their proximate networks.
Our primary insight is that the variation in firms’ innovative agency explains certain
changes in the macro-level properties of their supply networks. Thus, we find that supply networks
may exhibit different patterns of change depending on how innovative the focal firm is. We relate
these differences to the varying agential dispositions of firms. For firms depending on innovation
for survival, tapping supply network for knowledge is not an ad hoc activity but a continuous,
deliberate and directed process. While all firms are sometimes compelled to innovate in response
to unexpected circumstances such as adverse competitive actions, market shifts, or the emergence
of new technology, for less innovative firms tapping the knowledge base of their supply networks
is the exception rather than the rule. Their innovative agency is different from that of more
innovative firms, and therefore engenders different changes in the structure of their supply
networks.
Furthermore, we contribute to the growing body of research on the dynamics of supply
network evolution. Our results show that supply network structure should not be viewed as a static
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determinant of firms’ actions, but rather as a dynamic set of opportunities and constraints. An
emerging need to innovate may punctuate the equilibrium in a supply network forcing it to undergo
structural changes. Our findings also suggest that the complex evolutionary dynamics of supply
network structures is likely to be deeply intertwined over both micro and macro levels of analysis.
Finally, we contribute to studies of supply networks as complex systems by showing that supply
networks and their evolution can be better understood as open systems exhibiting nonlinear
patterns of change that cannot be fully explained by existing theoretical accounts.

Managerial insights
Can managers purposefully restructure supply networks to increase their efficiency or change one
or several structural properties? Our research provides evidence that supply networks are malleable
and can be made more or less fit for innovation diffusion. However, restructuring a complex
network is a challenging task. First, because networks are formed for different reasons of
individual companies, there is relational inertia and concomitant resistance to changes. Research
on supply network dynamics has shown that supply networks evolve in both predictable and
unpredictable ways. Second, few firms have adequate data on their supply networks to discern and
fill structural gaps. Third, operations management literature provides managers with minimal
guidance on how to reorganize supply networks to make them more efficient. Moreover, most
extant guidelines assume a static network and ignore network dynamics. In contrast, our research
is based on the dynamic nature of supply networks and can offer several important insights for
organizing a supply network to accelerate innovation.
First, collecting supply network data is necessary for a firm to tap the true potential of its
supply network. Network data will show where the network is fragmented or too clumpy. Further,
new organizations can be added to the network to improve its connectivity. For example,
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consultants can be placed as an additional bridge between very sparsely connected clusters. This
strategy will allow firms to know the resources available across the network, not just within their
own cluster. Firms generally tend to rely on partners within their own clusters for information and
prefer to avoid dependence on distant partners, because local partners provide advice that is more
sensitive to local conditions and norms. However, distant partners are important because they
might have more diverse knowledge than close sources.
Most guidance in the operations management literature is limited to working with
immediate suppliers. For example, Wagner and Bode (2014) show that integrating suppliers early
in the process of new product development enhances the project’s success. Our research suggests
that supplier engagement should reach out to deeper tiers of suppliers. A strategically placed
consulting firm or a new supplier in a certain important cluster may provide the necessary
connectivity or become a path around clusters that may dominate or control information diffusion.
Modern information technologies may dramatically enhance firms’ ability to connect with distant
and indirect partners and thus enhance their knowledge of the structure and dynamics of their
supply networks. For example, blockchain technology may enable network knowledge and
structural awareness to truly go “to scale” and facilitate structural action well beyond the bounds
of a firm’s proximate network.
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Appendix

Figure 4. The dynamics of the R&D expenses to sales ratio for Type 1 firms, April 2003 –
September 2010.
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Figure 5. The dynamics of the R&D expenses to sales ratio for Type 2 firms, April 2003 –
September 2010.
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Figure 6. The dynamics of the R&D expenses to sales ratio for Type 3 firms, April 2003 –
September 2010.
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Figure 7. The dynamics of the characteristic path lengths of Type 1 firms’ supply networks in
April 2003-September 2010 (black dots denote quarters in which compact, significant increases
in the ratio of R&D expenses to sales are observed).
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Figure 8. The dynamics of the Type 1 firms’ supply network density in April 2003-September
2010 (black dots denote quarters in which compact, significant increases in the ratio of R&D
expenses to sales are observed).
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Figure 9. The dynamics of the characteristic path lengths of Type 2 firms’ supply networks in April
2003-September 2010 (black dots denote quarters in which compact, significant increases in the
ratio of R&D expenses to sales are observed).
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Figure 10. The dynamics of the Type 2 firms’ supply network density in April 2003-September
2010 (black dots denote quarters in which compact, significant increases in the ratio of R&D
expenses to sales are observed).
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Figure 11. The dynamics of the characteristic path lengths of Type 3 firms’ supply networks in
April 2003-September 2010 (black dots denote quarters in which compact, significant increases
in the ratio of R&D expenses to sales are observed).
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Figure 12. The dynamics of the Type 3 firms’ supply network density in April 2003-September
2010 (black dots denote quarters in which compact, significant increases in the ratio of R&D
expenses to sales are observed).
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Figure 13. The dynamics of the total number of suppliers in the quarters immediately following
compact, significant increases in the ratio of R&D expenses to sales (25th -75th percentile; star
denotes the mean).
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Figure 14. The dynamics of network density in the quarters immediately following compact,
significant increases in the ratio of R&D expenses to sales (25th -75th percentile; star denotes the
mean).
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Figure 15. The dynamics of characteristic path length in the quarters immediately following
compact, significant increases in the ratio of R&D expenses to sales (25th -75th percentile; star
denotes the mean).
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Figure 16. The dynamics of the small world coefficient in the quarters immediately following
compact, significant increases in the ratio of R&D expenses to sales (25th -75th percentile; star
denotes the mean).
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Figure 17. The tierwise dynamics of the number of suppliers in the quarters immediately following compact, significant increases in
the ratio of R&D expenses to sales (25th -75th percentile; star denotes the mean).
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CONCLUSION
Networks are becoming increasingly important for economic and social life. Scholars in various
disciplines have developed theoretical perspectives of interfirm network formation and evolution
as well as provided accounts of the numerous ways in which interfirm networks influence
organizational outcomes. This dissertation brings the network perspective to supply chain
management research and illustrates some of the ways it can be applied to study various firm
actions and phenomena in more depth. Essay 1, for instance, applies network theory to examine
some of the effects of interfirm networks on the the outcomes of outside stakeholders such as
equity analysts. This method offers a practical insight for analysts: in order to achieve superior
forecast accuracy, they must be aware that some features of networks that they study may be too
complex for them to perceive accurately.
Furthermore, this dissertation illuminates some of the aspects of the dynamics of supply
network evolution. The results show that supply network structure should not be viewed as a static
determinant of firms’ actions, but rather as a dynamic set of opportunities and constraints. An
emerging need to innovate may punctuate the equilibrium in a supply network forcing it to undergo
structural changes. The findings also suggest that the complex evolutionary dynamics of supply
network structures is likely to be deeply intertwined over both micro and macro levels of analysis.
Besides, this dissertation contributes to studies of supply networks as complex systems by showing
that supply networks and their evolution can be better understood as open systems exhibiting
nonlinear patterns of change that cannot be fully explained by existing theoretical accounts.
The fact that supply networks are malleable is practically important. If networks are
malleable, they can be made more or less fit for innovation diffusion. Restructuring a complex
network is, of course, a challenging task. First, because networks are formed for different reasons
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of individual companies, there is relational inertia and concomitant resistance to changes. Research
on supply network dynamics has shown that supply networks evolve in both predictable and
unpredictable ways. Second, few firms have adequate data on their supply networks to discern and
fill structural gaps. Third, operations management literature provides managers with minimal
guidance on how to reorganize supply networks to make them more efficient. Moreover, most
extant guidelines assume a static network and ignore network dynamics.
This dissertation provides some remedies to these drawbacks. It offers insights about the
ways in which existing structural properties of interfirm networks influence the extent of their
transformation. For instance, firms form more new ties and delete more existing ties in response
to an increase in partner-specific uncertainty in networks with greater path lengths. This suggests
that networks in which partners are, on average, farther away from each other undergo a larger
structural change as a result of an increase in endogenous uncertainty. Moreover, the degree of
clustering significantly affects the rate of tie deletion and has no effect on tie creation. A higher
clustering may indicate a greater degree of solidarity among close partners, which may become a
source of collective pressure constraining firms from modifying of their dependence by forming
alternative ties and motivating them instead to drop weaker existing ties to redirect resources to
accommodate the demands of a major buyer which the cluster views as a common good.
Next, this dissertation aims to contribute to the small literature on the origins of distant ties.
The literature on distant ties shows that their formation is motivated by factors other than those
triggering the formation of the majority of organizational ties which are local (Rosenkopf and
Padula, 2008). The factors leading firms to create distant ties are relatively less known. At the
same time, distant ties are fundamental for network change because a handful of such ties can
transform the structure of a network turning it into a small-world (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). We
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identify a new origin of distant ties. The results of this dissertation results show that such
contextually ubiquitous phenomena as an increase in uncertainty specific to a major exchange
partner and the concomitant need to balance the dependence may prompt firms to form new distant
ties.
This provides managers with important caveats regarding power and its use in
interorganizational relations. The literature on organizational power dynamics argues that power
is predominantly a structural phenomenon: the existing structure of relationships in a network
defines which actor is more powerful. At the same time, a less powerful actor may increase its
power relative to a more powerful actor through finding alternatives outside the exchange
relationship. The resource dependence logic rests on the assumption that a firm is always motivated
to lessen dependence on its present exchange partners. An increase in the uncertainty unique to a
more powerful firm may give its managers an impression that its suppliers will necessarily search
for alternative partners and start developing new ties if they observe a change in the rhythm of
exchange. Such impression may lead the powerful firm to take actions to counter the suppliers’
gains in power.
I show that this is not always the case. Firms do not always act on this motivation. They
do so when the larger environment is munificent enough to support new tie formation, most new
buyer ties are formed in more distant parts of the network. Such ties are usually weaker, more
uncertain, and costlier to maintain. They may be short-term, short-lived options. In this light, while
such restructuring may be beneficial for the focal firm’s suppliers, it is not a serious threat to the
focal firm’s power. Moreover, these new distant ties make the network more efficient in circulating
information and knowledge from more distant parts to the focal firm. In a way, these new distant
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ties may even benefit the focal firm through an increased inflow of new ideas and knowledge from
other communities in the network.
When the environment’s munificence is lower, suppliers actually lower their rates of tie
formation, thereby relying on existing ties to cope with the shifts in the rhythm of exchange. These
shifts in tie formation emphasize the switch towards mostly heuristic-based decisions accentuating
homophilous pairing, engaging old partners, and forming ties with partners of existing partners as
major mechanisms of new tie formation. Suppliers prefer the comfort zone and relative certainty
of their existing ego-networks to forming ties with unknown partners. In this regard, the structure
of the network solidifies the power of the focal firm.
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